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An Undetectable Constitutional Violation
Jfl Wieber Lens'
ABSTRACT

In Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the Supreme Court mandated that lower
courts implement proceduralprotections to ensure that the jury, when awarding
punitive damages, properly considers evidence of the defendant's harming
nonparties. Thejury can consider that evidence when deternining the level of the
defendant's reprehensibility,butpunishmentfor causing that nonpartyharm would
violate the defendant'sconstitutionalnghts.
Ten years later, this Article is the first to examine lower courts' attempts to
comply with Philip Morris. The Article first seeks to clrifj how evidence of
nonparty harm can demonstrate reprehensibilty, a clarification necessary before
courts can even begin to try to apply Philip Morris's reprehensibilty-punishment
distinction. The Article then both criticizes the protection most lower courts have
used-vague limiting instructions-andsuggests alternative protections. A new
rule governing the admissibilty of nonparty harm should be used because of the
constitutionalimplications of the admission of the evidence. Courts should also
include explanations within thei limiting instructions and aggressively review
awardsforpossible Philip Morris violations despite the use oflimitinginstructions.

1 Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law (J.D., University of Iowa
College of Law; B.A., University of Wisconsin). The author thanks Todd Pettys, Jeremy Counsellor,
and James Wren for their comments on earlier drafts. The author also thanks her many bright and
capable research assistants: Ian Todd (Baylor J.D. 2016), Monica Lite (Baylor J.D. 2016), Mitch
Garrett (Baylor J.D. 2016), and Ashley Morgan (Baylor J.D. 2016). Any mistakes are, of course, the
author's.
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An Undetectable Constitutional Violation
INTRODUCTION

Although we cannot know how the jury determines the amount of punitive
damages, we do know that the way the jury does so can make the award
unconstitutional. In Phip Monis USA v. Williams the Supreme Court declared
that a punitive damage award is unconstitutional if it punishes the
defendant
for
harming
nonparties.
2 Thus, if the jury hears evidence that the defendant hurt others than the named
plaintiff, the jury cannot use the punitive damage award to punish the defendant
for harming those others.
An additional nuance exists, however, because there is a way that the jury can
permissibly consider evidence of the defendant's harming nonparties.' This
possibility exists because, in the Court's words, if "the conduct that harmed the
plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public," it "was
particularly reprehensible." 4 And the more reprehensible the conduct, the more
severe the punishment.5
Thus, it is permissible for the jury to consider evidence of nonparty harm to
determine reprehensibility, but the jury cannot then punish the defendant for
causing that nonparty harm. The jury must appreciate the distinction and not
punish nonparty harm because to do so would violate the defendant's constitutional
rights.' To help the jury, Phip Moris mandated that lower courts adopt
procedural protections to "provide assurance that the jury will ask the right
question, not the wrong one."' Ultimately, though, the jury decides whether to
award punitive damages-and how much to award-during jury deliberations, and
we can never know for sure the jury's bases for its decision.
The Court decided Phibp Moris ten years ago. The goal of this Article is to
study the reprehensibility-punishment distinction both to see how it has been
interpreted and implemented. This research revealed that ten years later, lower
courts are, perhaps unsurprisingly, still struggling-in ways they might not even
realize-with the distinction.
Part of that struggle is based on the reprehensibility-punishment distinction
itself. Most lower courts have assumed that nonparty harm always demonstrates
reprehensibility, an incorrect assumption that the majority in Philp Morris also
made.' Nonparty harm can just as easily demonstrate negligence and courts must
recognize so and avoid unnecessarily enabling a Phibp Morisviolation.

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 356-57 (2007).
' See id at 355-57.
4 Id. at 355.
s See id. at 357 (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995)).
6 Id. at 353.
7
Id. at 355.
'See infra Section II.A.ii.
See id at 355; see alsoinfra Section II.A.i.
2
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Lower courts are also struggling with what procedures to use to implement
Philip Moris. The vast majority of courts still admit evidence of nonparty harm
and use limiting instructions, presuming that the jury will follow the instructions."0
Many problems exist with this approach. Courts overestimate the relevance of
nonparty harm to reprehensibility and thus only rarely exclude evidence under
current rules, which mandate exclusion only when the evidence's prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs its probative value." With respect to limiting instructions,
many doubt whether jurors follow them.' This doubt should make courts hesitant
to use them to protect constitutional rights, especially because reliance on limiting
instructions makes it difficult to detect Phip Monris violations."
The Supreme Court left it to lower courts to experiment with procedural
protections to satisfy Phip Morris and lower courts should do so." One possible
protection is a different balancing test to judge the admissibility of evidence of
nonparty harm. The test would mandate exclusion if the prejudicial effect of the
evidence merely outweighs the evidence's probative value. This is similar to the test
courts use to evaluate the admissibility of prior convictions to impeach a criminal
defendant.s A second possibility is improved jury instructions, ones that provide
jurors with explanations regarding how evidence of nonparty harm can demonstrate
reprehensibility and why jurors cannot punish the defendant for causing nonparty
harm. Finally, a third possibility is more aggressive judicial review that does not
simply defer to jury instructions. The combination of these mechanisms will better
guarantee that lower courts ensure that juries ask the right question, not the wrong
one, as Philp Monis mandates."
Part I of this Article describes the Court's development of the reprehensibilitypunishment distinction, allowing the jury to consider evidence of nonparty harm to
determine reprehensibility, but not as a basis for punishment. Part II then turns to
the results of the research on how Phip Monris has been interpreted and
implemented in the past ten years. It describes that both the Supreme Court and
lower courts are overestimating the relationship between nonparty harm and
reprehensibility. It also explores and criticizes the procedural protections lower
courts have used to attempt to implement Phip Monis, and it suggests other
reforms.

to See infra Section II.B.ii.1.
n See infra Section II.B.i.

1See infra Section II.B.ii.2.
*1 4 See infra Section II.B.iii.
See Phihp Mortis, 549 U.S. at 355.
1 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
16 PhihpMoris, 549 U.S. at 355; see also ifra
Part II.
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1. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REPREHENSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT

In Phlp Moris USA v. Willnams, the Supreme Court declared that the jury
could consider evidence of the defendant's harming nonparties to determine the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, but could not punish that nonparty
harm." The Court had previously made the same distinction with respect to the
defendant's out-of-state conduct in BMW of North America, Inc v. Gord" and
again in State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.9
Despite appearing in the three punitive damage cases, the reprehensibilitypunishment distinction can still be puzzling. That was apparent early on-in
Justice Stevens's dissent to Phihp Moris.2 0
A. Evidence ofDefendant's HamingNonparties
In Phip Moris,2 1 the plaintiff-the widow of a man who died from lung
cancer-brought negligence and fraud claims against the cigarette manufacturer.22
The fraud claims were based on the defendant's false representations "that there
was a legitimate controversy about whether there was a connection between
cigarette smoking and human health." 23 Plaintiff alleged that the defendant made
these representations "intend[ing] to encourage smokers to continue to smoke and
not to make the necessary effort to stop smoking."24
In dosing arguments, the plaintiffs attorney mentioned that the defendant had
made these misrepresentations to many more than the individual plaintiff "It's fair
to think about how many other Jesse Williams[es] in the last 40 years in the State
of Oregon there have been. It's more than fair to think about how many more are
out there in the future."2 5 The attorney further asked the jury, "[H]ow many people
do we see outside . . . smoking cigarettes? For every hundred, [sic] cigarettes that

they smoke are going to kill ten through lung cancer."26
The jury found the defendant liable for negligence and fraud,27 and awarded
$79.5 million in punitive damages.28 Philip Morris appealed, arguing that $79.5
million punitive damage award was unconstitutional because it "represented
17 Id.

at 355.
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-77 (1996).
19 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419-24 (2003).
20 See Phihp Monis, 549 U.S. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21 549 U.S. 346.
' Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), vacated sub non. Philip
Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801 (2003).
2 Id. at 832.
24 Id. at 832-33.
25 Joint Appendix at 197a, Phil
Morris, 549 U.S. 346 (No. 05-1256).
26 Id. at 199a.
27 Williams, 48 P.3d
at 828.
28 Phibp Morris, 549 U.S. at 350. The trial court found the award excessive and reduced
it to $32
million. Id But, the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the $79.5 million punitive award. Wiliams, 48
P.3d at 842; see abo Philp Morris, 549 U.S at 350.
1s
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punishment for its having harmed others" and not just the plaintiff to the lawsuit.2 9
The Supreme Court agreed: "We did not previously hold explicitly that a jury
may not punish for the harm caused others. But we do so hold now."' The Court
found that punishment for nonparty harm violates procedural due process in two
ways." First, it deprives the defendant the opportunity to defend itself against the
claims of injured nonparties.32 For instance, the defendant would not be liable if the
nonparties knew that smoking was dangerous, and thus, could not establish reliance
on the defendant's misrepresentations." Without reliance, liability and punishment
would not be appropriate. Second, punishment for harm to nonparties would "add
a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation" based on the
amount of harmed nonparties, the extent of their injuries, and the circumstances of
those injuries.' These questions, which will likely not be answered in the trial,
heighten the "risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice" inherent in
imposing punitive damages.3 s
The plaintiff claimed that the jury's consideration of nonparty harm, however,
was proper because the evidence is relevant to the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct.3 Both the defendant and the Supreme Court agreed with that
relevance." As the Court explained, "harm to others shows more reprehensible
conduct," and conduct is "particularly reprehensible" if it "also posed a substantial
risk of harm to the general public." Still, "a jury may not go further than this and
use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms

PhibpMorris,549 U.S. at 351.
* Id. at 356-57.
31 Id. at 353-54. Many, including myself, have questioned the procedural due process
basis for the
holding. See, e.g., Jill Wieber Lens, ProceduralDue Process andPredictablePunitive DamageAwards
2012 BYU L. REv. 1, 21 (2012); Vikram David Amar, Business and ConstitutionalOnginalsmin the
Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 979, 982-83 (2009) (explaining that he found the purported
procedural due process basis of Philip Morris as "not quite convincing," and suggesting its purpose was
to obtain Justices Roberts's and Alito's votes and allow them "to sleep a little easier"); Thomas B. Colby,
Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive
Damges, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 401-05 (2008) (explaining that the Court intentionally disguises
substantive due process decisions as procedural due process decisions because it is "ashamed of the
substantive due process doctrine's very existence"); David L. Franklin, What Kind ofBusiness-Friendly
Court? Explaining the Chamber of Commerce's Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 1019, 1038-39 (2009) ("Perhaps in order to keep the Chief Justice and Justice Alito from
defecting, Justice Breyer took [great] pains in Philip Morris to ground his opinion in the procedural
rather than the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause . . . ."); see also PhihpMoris, 549 U.S. at
361 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that a "'procedural' rule is simply a confusing implementation
of the substantive due process regime this Court has created for punitive damages" (citing Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1991) (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment)).
32 PhipMorris,549 U.S. at 353-54.
33
29

Id.

34Id.

at 354.

365Id.

3 Id.at
37

1id.

38id

355.
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it is alleged to have visited on nonparties."
Ultimately, the Court mandated that lower courts provide "some form of
protection" to ensure that the jury considers the evidence of harm to nonparties in
evaluating reprehensibility, but not in determining how much to punish the
defendant.40
B. Evidence ofthe Defendant's Out-of-State Conduct
The reprehensibility-punishment distinction was not new in Phihp Morris. It
first appeared in BMWofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore4 1 and again in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Canpbell42 Tose cases are usually
remembered for the introduction of the "guideposts," or the factors courts are
supposed to use to determine if an award is excessive.43 They include the level of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct," whether the punitive damages "bear a
'reasonable relationship' to [the] compensatory damages" awarded,' and a
comparison of the punitive damage award to the civil or criminal penalties imposed
for comparable conduct. 6 Applying the guideposts to BMW the Court, for the
first time, found a punitive damage award unconstitutionally excessive.47
But BMW and State Farm also included another limitation, a "contour[] of
9

3' Id.

Id. at 357 (emphasis in original).
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-80 (1996).
42 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418-19 (2003).
4 See, e.g., Laura J. Hines & N. William Hines, ConstitutionalConstraintson PunitiveDanagesClaity, Consistency, and the OutlierDilemma,66 HASTINGS LJ. 1257 (2015).
4 BMW 517 U.S. at 575. In State Farm, the Court listed factors relevant to the leveLof
reprehensibility: whether "the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct
evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others . . . the conduct
involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident, and the harm was the result of intentional malice,
trickery, or deceit, or mere accident." 538 U.S. at 419 (citing BA1W, 517 U.S. at 575-77).
4s BMW 517 U.S. at 580. The Court declined to define what constitutes a "reasonable
relationship." Id. at 580-83. But later, in State Fam, clarified that "[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more
likely to comport with due process."538 U.S. at 425. Still, the Court acknowledged that a different ratio
maybe constitutionally permissible: "The precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the
facts and circumstances of the defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff"Id.
4 BMW 517 U.S. at 583. For a thorough review of how lower courts have applied the guideposts,
see Hines & Hines, supra note 43.
47 BMW 517 U.S. at 585-86. Many courts have still treated Phihp Monis as a limitation within
the guideposts. See, e.g., In re Tylenol, 144 F. Supp. 3d 680, 692 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (labeling Phlbp
Moris as a "caveat" to the guideposts); Feuerstein v. Simpson, No. 04-134, 2013 WL 5431723, at *2
(D.V.I. Sept. 30, 2013) (discussing Philp Morris within the ratio guidepost); St. Croix Renaissance
Grp., LLLP v. St. Croix Alumina, LLC, No. 04-67, 2011 WL 2160910, at *11 (D.V.I. May 31, 2011)
(same); Cooley v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 776 F. Supp. 2d 511, 549 &n.193 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (same); Tse
v. UBS Fin. Servs., 568 F. Supp. 2d 274, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing Phihp Morriswithinthe
ratio guidepost); Chopra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 230, 245-46 (D. Conn. 2007) (same); R.O.
v. A.C., 384 S.W.3d 185, 191 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (same); McDonald's Corp. v. Ogborn, 309 S.W.3d
274, 299 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) (same); Hollis v. Stonington Dev., LLC, 714 S.E.2d 904, 913-14 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2011) (same).
4

41
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punitive damages as a remedial device."48 That contour was that a punitive damage
award cannot punish the defendant for out-of-state conduct.49 The Court also
explained in State Farm that punitive damages cannot punish a defendant for
"dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised."so
Many were not surprised with the result of Plup Monis because of this.
Although the Court prohibited punishment for out-of-state conduct, it
acknowledged that the jury could still consider evidence of out-of-state conduct to
determine the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.s' "Lawful out-of-state
conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability
of the defendant's action in the State where it is tortious, but that conduct must
have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff."5 2 And thus, the Court

created the reprehensibility-punishment distinction, allowing consideration of
out-of-state conduct to determine reprehensibility, but prohibiting punishment
based on the same conduct.
In State Fanm, the Court mandated that "[a] jury must be instructed . .. that it
may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant for action that
was lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred."s" This procedural protection to
implement to the reprehensibility-punishment distinction was one of many
procedural protections that the Court has mandated in the imposition of punitive
damages. In PacificMutual Life Insurance Co. vHasho, the Court found that the
combination of Alabama's jury instructions and judicial review sufficiently
protected the defendant's procedural due process rights.54 Shortly after, in Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg, the Court confirmed that procedural due process requires
judicial review because of "the possibility that a jury will not follow those
instructions and may return a lawless, biased, or arbitrary verdict."ss And in PlAp
" Michael P. Allen, Of Remedy, Judes, and State Regulation of Punitive Damages: The
Signidcance ofPhilip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 351-54 (2008).
' First, conduct could be legal in another state, making punishment inappropriate. See BMW 517
U.S. at 572-73. And federalism principles prevent Texas from punishing conduct that occurred in
Oklahoma. Id. at 572. ("We think it follows from these principles of state sovereignty and comity that a
State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the
tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States.") (footnote omitted).
so 538 U.S. at 422-23. Factually, State Farm was a bad-faith failure to settle a claim brought by an
insured against an insurer. The plaintiff, at trial, introduced evidence of State Farm's "national scheme
to meet corporate fiscal goals by capping [insurance policy] payouts on claims company wide." Id. at 415
(quoting Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Utah 2001)). Other victims
of the alleged scheme were not parties to the litigation, however, and most of the practices in the alleged
scheme "bore no relation to third-party automobile insurance claims" like the plaintiffs. Id.
s1 Id. at 422.
52 Id.
s3 Id. (citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996)).
54 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991).
" Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 433 (1994); see also id. at 432 (explaining that
"[j]ury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts," enabling juries to
use punitive damages to express bias against big businesses, and that judicial review is "one of the few
procedural safeguards which the common law provided against that danger"); State Farm, 538 U.S. at
418 ("Exacting appellate review ensures that an award of punitive damages is based upon 'an application
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Morris, the Court mandated that lower courts use some procedural protectionsbut not necessarily a jury instruction-to ensure that the punitive damage award
does not punish the defendant for harming nonparties.5 6
C. AddressingJustice Stevens's Concerns
Although the reprehensibility-punishment distinction was not new to Philip
Morris, it was still controversial. The controversy started with Justice Stevens's
dissent.s" In his words, the "nuance"-between permissibly using nonparty harm to
determine reprehensibility but not to punish for it-"eludes me."" He further
explained, "When a jury increases a punitive damages award because injuries to
third parties enhanced the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the jury is by
definition punishing the defendant-directly-for third-party harm. 5 9 In short,
Justice Stevens thought it impossible to consider the evidence for reprehensibility
and not also punish based on it.
Justice Stevens was not alone in his criticism. Academics and commentators
questioned both the distinction itself and the jury's ability to make it. "Practically
speaking, if the nuance eludes a Supreme Court Justice, it can be expected to elude
the vast majority of jurors as weL This is not a minor point."a Similarly, "[o]ne
would reasonably fear that the distinction will elude any jury that is directed to take
of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice.' (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp.,
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001)).
56 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,357
(2007).
57 See, e.g., id. at 358-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Notably, Justice Stevens wrote the majority
opinion in BMW in which he discussed both a state's inability to punish out-of-state conduct and that
conduct's relevance to reprehensibility. 517 U.S. at 572-73, 575-80. Justice Stevens also joined the
majority opinion in State Farm, which further developed the reprehensibility-punishment distinction for
out of state conduct. See generally State Farm, 538 U.S. 408.
ss PhilMorris,549 U.S. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
s' Id. (footnote omitted). In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg expressed confusion at the jury instruction
that Philip Morris offered. Id. at 363 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). It instructed:
The size of any punishment should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to Jesse
Williams by the defendant's punishable misconduct Although you may consider the extent of
harm suffered by others in determining what that reasonable relationship is, you are not to
punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons, who may
bring lawsuits of their own in which other juries can resolve their claims and award punitive
damages for those hanns, as such other juries see fit.

.

Id. In her words, the answer of how the jury was to consider "the extent of harm suffered by others . .
slips from [her] grasp. A judge seeking to enlighten rather than confuse surely would resist delivering
the requested charge." Id

a Jim Gash, The End of an Era: The Supreme Court (Finally)Butts out of Punitive Damagesfor
Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525, 590 (2011); see abo F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits
on Punitive Damages Awards: "Mora& Without Technique"?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 351 (2008)
(explaining that Philp Morris "requires states either to do something that is virtually impossible-i.e.,
craft an instruction that enables lay persons to follow a distinction that is unclear to four Supreme Court
Justices-or to give jury instructions that are, at best, empty formalistic incantations about a meaningless
and potentially confusing distinction").
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into account harm to non-parties when deciding the appropriate level of a punitive
award, but that is admonished not to punish the defendant for inflicting such
harm." 6' Another commentator believed that if the jury is still allowed to consider
nonparty harm for reprehensibility purposes, the jury will still be asking "the wrong
question . . . . Inevitably, juries will have to consider-whether indirectly or
directly-the injury to nonparties in order to ascertain the constitutionally
appropriate amount of punitive damages to award."6 2 Put more simply, in Professor
Thomas Colby's words, the distinction between reprehensibility and punishment
"does indeed appear to be absurd."63
Professor Scheuerman and Anthony Franze, leading scholars on punitive
damage jury instructions, acknowledged Justice Stevens's concern, but argued that
the reprehensibility-punishment distinction was no different from any other
evidentiary distinction the jury is asked to make.' True, any evidentiary limiting
instruction requires a jury to perform "a mental gymnastic"s to some extent-to
appreciate two concepts and decipher the ability to evaluate the evidence only in
light of one context.
But it does seem that a PhilipMornisjury instruction would be more difficult to
apply than other limiting instructions. For comparison purposes, consider a hearsay
example. Suppose evidence exists of someone's out-of-court statement that the
defendant was "out to get" the plaintiff. As hearsay, that evidence is not admissible
to show its truth, that the defendant was actually out to get the plaintiff.' But, if
relevant, the evidence would be admissible to show that the plaintiff believed the
defendant was out to get her, that would show her state of mind.6 7 The
out-of-court statement is admissible, but a limiting instruction is necessary." That
instruction would be something akin to: "you may not consider the statement for
the truth of the matter asserted, but you may consider it to show the plaintiffs state
of mind." This limiting instruction still involves mental gymnastics. But the
distinction is also capable of being understood. The jury can understand that the
Amar, supra note 31, at 980.
Working the Unworkable Rule Establshedin Philip Morris:Acknowledging
the Diference Between Actual and Potential Injury to Nonparties, 2007 BYU L. REv. 1317, 1355
(2007).
63 Colby, supra note 31, at 465.
' Sheila B. Scheuerman & Anthony J. Franze, Instnctingjies
on Punitive Damages: Due
ProcessRevisited After Philip Morris v. Williams, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1147 (2008). Mock juror
studies have shown that the effectiveness of limiting instructions can depend on the reason for the
inadmissibility of the evidence. See generally Kerri L. Pickel, InducingJurors to DisregardInadwssible
Evidence: A LegalExplanationDoes Not Help, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 407 (1995) (discussing that
studies have shown that juries are unable to disregard illegally obtained evidence and prior convictions,
but can disregard settlement offers, remedial measures, liability insurance, and hearsay). Professor Pickel
suggests that the different treatments may have something to do with the jurors' inherent views of the
fairness of considering the evidence. Id. at 421-23.
65 Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
6 E.g., FED. R. EvID. 801(c)(2), 802.
67 Id. at 803(3).
6 Id. at 105.
6

0 Daniel Sulser Agle,
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plaintiff felt scared after being told that the "defendant was out to get her" without
also concluding that the defendant actually was out to get her. If the jury considers
the hearsay to show the plaintiffs state of mind, it is not necessarily also
considering the hearsay for the truth of the matter asserted.
With Phip Monis, however, it is not as easy to separate reprehensibility and
punishment because they are related. The level of reprehensibility should control
the amount of punishment. Confusingly, fact A (nonparty harm) is relevant to
purpose 1 (reprehensibility), but impermissible to consider for purpose
2 (punishment), but purpose 1 (reprehensibility) must also be considered for
purpose 2 (punishment).6 ' No such overlap exists between the truth of the matter
asserted and the state of mind, but it does between reprehensibility and
punishment. If the jury considers the nonparty harm for purposes of
reprehensibility and increases the punitive award because of it, the jury has arguably
also used the nonparty harm as a basis for punishment: "[I]f harm to others
determines reprehensibility, and reprehensibility determines punishment, then
punishment is based upon harm to others, which is prohibited."o
Despite
the
difficulty
of
juries
actually
the
applying
reprehensibility-punishment distinction, most academics agree-and disagree with
Justice Stevens-that the distinction does exist." A distinction exists between
1) increasing a punishment for the defendant's tenth incident, when the previous
nine incidents demonstrate the elevated reprehensibility of that tenth incident, and
2) increasing a punishment because of the totality of the ten incidents. Thus,
increasing a punishment due to reprehensibility based on nonparty harm is not the
same as punishing for that nonparty harm.
II. PHILIPMORRISTEN YEARS LATER

Ten
years
have
passed
since
the
Court
cemented
the
reprehensibility-punishment distinction in Phil Moris.72 The research in this
article examines the effect of Phi@o Monis by studying how lower federal and state
courts have interpreted and applied it. The research began with reviewing all cases
that have cited Phip Monis." As of December 2016, 269 federal and state court
cases have cited Phip Moris although not all citations concerned punitive
damages.74 The research also examined federal and state model jury instructions to
see if any instructions had been adopted in response to Phip Monris.
See Agle, supra note 62, at 1355.
0 Sergey Budylin, Punitive Damager as a SocialHarmMeasure:EconomicAnaysis Continues, 31
OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 457, 502-03 (2006).
n See, e.g., Dan Markel, Retibutive Damages:A Theory of Punidve Damages as Intermediate
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 327-28, 328 n.300 (2009).
72 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
1 The research was limited to cases available on either LexisNexis or Westlaw. Necessarily, the
research did not capture all unpublished opinions.
74 According to Westlaw as of December 15, 2016, ten years after its issuance, Phihp Moris has
been cited in 269 cases. Many citations do not actually involve alleged Phihp Monis violations. In fact,
61

190

KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL

Vol. Io6

The research had two purposes. The first was to see how lower courts are
interpreting the reprehensibility-punishment distinction. The second was to see
how lower courts are attempting to implement the distinction, ensuring that the
jury asks the right question-considering evidence of nonparty harm to determine
reprehensibility-and not the wrong one-punishing based on that nonparty harm.
The research revealed two results. First, a misunderstanding of how nonparty
harm demonstrates reprehensibility persists. Second, lower courts are using likely
insufficient methods to ensure the jury asks the right question. The Article suggests
other procedural reforms to better ensure that the jury asks the right question and
avoids imposing an unconstitutional punitive damage award.
A. The Relatonship Between NonpartyHarm andReprehensibilty
Most academic commentary on the reprehensibility-punishment distinction has
focused on Justice Stevens's mistaken criticism." But Justice Stevens is not the only
one who misunderstood the distinction. The majority also incorrectly described
that nonparty harm shows that the defendant's conduct was reprehensible. Lower
courts have repeated that majority's mistake, increasing the chances that juries
unintentionally violate Phlp Monis-by increasing a punitive damage award
some citations do not even involve punitive damages. See, e.g., Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
1710, 1729 (2014); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2743 (2010); SEC v.
McNamee, 481 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 132 F. Supp.
3d 558, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Grisham v. Philip Morris, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1036 (C.D. Cal.
2009); In re Late Fee & Over-Limit Fee Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 953, 959 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Duran v.
U.S. Bank Natl Ass'n, 325 P.3d 916, 935 (Cal. 2014); Williams v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., 271 P.3d
103, 105 (Or. 2011); Barton v. State Bd. for Educator Certification, 382 S.W.3d 405, 412 (Tex. App.
2012). Sometimes the citation to Phih Monis was just part of a string cite to the Supreme Court's
numerous punitive damages holdings. See, e.g., In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg., Sales Practices
& Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2436, No. 2:13-md-02436, No. 2:12-cv-07263, 2015 WL 2417411, at
*8 n.44 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2015); Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch., 24 F. Supp. 3d 155, 212 n.36 (D. Conn.
2014); Adams v. United States, No. 03-0049-E-BLW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54420, at *15 (D. Idaho
June 25, 2009); Norris v. N.Y.C. Coll. of Tech., No. 07-CV-853, 2009 WL 82556, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 14, 2009); Hirsh v. Lecuona, No. 8:06CV13, 2008 WL 2795859, at *6 (D. Neb. July 18, 2008);
StayInFront, Inc. v. Tobin, 570 F. Supp. 2d 603, 609 (D.N.J. 2008); Garrett v. Albright, No. 06-CV4137-NKL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22530, at *39 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2008); Heaton v. Weitz Co.,
No. 05-CV-102-LRR, 2007 WL 2034370, at *10 (N.D. Iowa July 13, 2007); Morris v. Flaig, 511 F.
Supp. 2d 282, 310 n.20 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Premium Iowa Pork, L.L.C. v. Banss Schlacht Und
Foerdertechnik, GMBH, No. C06-4051-MWB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21616, at *35 (N.D. Iowa
Mar. 24, 2007); Estate of Embry v. Geo Transp. of Ind., Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 914, 920 (E.D. Ky.
2007); Porter v. Cabral, No. 04-11935-DPW, 2007 WL 602605, at *9 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 2007);
Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins., Co. 371 P.3d 242, 246 (Cal. 2016); Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc., 164
Cal. Rptr. 3d 112, 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); Warren v. Shelter Mut. Ins., 196 So. 3d 776, 810 (La. Ct.
App. 2016); RRR, Inc. v. Toggas 674 S.E.2d 170, 171 (S.C. 2009).
Additionally, many citations to Philp Mois did not concern implementing the reprehensibilitypunishment distinction; instead, many cases have integrated the distinction into the ratio constitutional
guidepost even though Phip Monis is a very different limitation. See supra note 47. Many of the cases
citing Philp Monris that actually involved potential Phip Morrisviolations are discussed in Part II. See
discussion infra Section II.B.iii.1.
7s See, e.g., Markel, supra note 71.
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based on nonparty harm that does not actually demonstrate the defendant's
reprehensible mental state.
i. The Majority's Mistaken Explanation of the
Reprehensibility-Punishment Distinction
The Philp Morris majority implied that evidence of nonparty harm
automaticallydemonstrates increased reprehensibility. 6 It explained that evidence
of nonparty harm shows "that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a
substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly
reprehensible."' Similarly, it less forcefully explained that "conduct that risks harm
to many is likely more reprehensible than conduct that risks harm to only a few."*
Plainly, the defendant's conduct is more reprehensible simply because it hurt or
endangered others.
If a defendant's conduct is automatically more reprehensible just because that
same conduct injured or endangered both the plaintiff and nonparties, then the jury
can increase the punitive damage award based on the existence of that nonparty
harm." That conception of the reprehensibility-punishment distinction differs
little from Justice Stevens's position that increasing damages based on nonparty
harm demonstrating reprehensibility is the same thing as punishing that nonparty
harm.80

Most agree that Justice Stevens was incorrect to deny the distinction,"' and the
Plibp Morris majority is similarly incorrect to equal nonparty harm with
reprehensibility. Nonparty harm does not automatically demonstrate
reprehensibility because reprehensibility is ultimately a question about the
defendant's mental state.82 Punitive damages are available when the defendant's
conduct is reprehensible," meaning that the defendant acted either "with an evil
71 Phip
77

Moris, 549 U.S. at 355.
d.
7
1 d. at 357.
79

Id.at 355.

" See id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[a] murderer who kills his victim by
throwing a bomb that injures dozens of bystanders should be punished more severely than one who
harms no one other than his intended victim"). Justice Stevens likely believes that nonparty harm
automatically demonstrates reprehensibility, meaning more severe punishment would also be
appropriate for the defendant who tortiously injures multiple victims. Criminal law may work like that,
but punitive damages do not. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing when punitive
damages are available). Punitive damages are not available simply because the defendant injured many
victims; instead, they are available only if the jury determines the defendant acted reprehensibly. Phip
Monis, 549 U.S. at 357. Reprehensibility is not based on the amount of people hurt; it is about whether
the defendant acted with evil intent. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. Increasing the
amount of victims does not necessarily translate to evil intent.
81 See, e.g., Markel, supra note 71, at 327-28.
* See id.; see also infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
* State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
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motive" or "with reckless indifference to the rights of others."8 A defendant acts
with reckless indifference when he consciously disregards the fact that his conduct
creates a highly probable risk of death or substantial physical harm to another.8 s
Reckless conduct is thus more culpable than merely negligent conduct, which, if it
involves knowledge of a risk, involves only disregarding a risk that a reasonable
person would not have disregarded.' Regardless, punitive damages are available if
the defendant acts reprehensibly, meaning he either had an "evil" intent or acted
recklessly. 7 Either standard, as the Supreme Court itself has explained, depends on
the defendant's mental state."8
The Court's original explanations of how repeated conduct can demonstrate
reprehensibility explicitly recognized that reprehensibility is a mental state. In
BMW the Court explained that "[c]ertainly, evidence that a defendant has
repeatedly engaged in prohibited conduct while knowing or suspecting thatit was
wrlawfi would provide relevant support for an argument that strong medicine is
required to cure the defendant's disrespect for the law."" The Court also
analogized greater punitive damages based on repeated conduct to greater criminal
punishment for a recidivist, meaning a convicted criminal who reoffends." The
"repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of
malfeasance."' Again though, that increased reprehensibility exists because of the
prior convictions, which show that the recidivist knew of the wrongfulness of his
later conduct.
The Court did not, however, highlight that reprehensibility is a mental state
when it described the factors relevant to the reprehensibility guidepost in State
Faim. Those factors included whether "the tortious conduct evinced an
indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others,"92 and
whether "the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident."" But
8

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
§ 500 cmt. b.

sId.

Id. § 908, § 908 cmt. b.
" Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 538 (1999).
Id. (emphasis added).
90
Id.
9 Id. at 577 (citing Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)).
SId (citing BMW 517 U.S. at 576-77). This factor may not actually be about nonparty harm.
This language is the common definition of recklessness, and this factor may just be about whether the
defendant acted intentionally, recklessly, or negligently in injuring the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Supporting this possibility is that another factor
asks whether the "harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident," not
mentioning the possibility that the injury was the result of recklessness, meaning another factor is
needed to ask if the defendant's conduct was reckless. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing BMW 517
U.S. at 576-77). At the same time, the factor does refer to "others," and any injury to others would be
nonparty harm. Id. (citing BMW 517 U.S. at 576-77).
9 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing BMW 517 U.S. at 576-77). These factors about nonparty
harm may or may not demonstrate reprehensibility. Two other factors, similarly, may or may not be
relevant to reprehensibility-whether "the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic," and "the
target of the conduct had financial vulnerability." Id. (citing BMW 517 U.S. at 576-77). A defendant
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the Court later made dear that nonparty harm does not necessarily demonstrate
reprehensibility. To the contrary, the Court explained that "[1]awful out-of-state
conduct," which is also nonparty harm, "maybe probative when it demonstrates the
deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State where it is
tortious."94 So the nonparty harm can demonstrate reprehensibility, but does not
necessarily do so.
Factual examples also demonstrate that evidence of nonparty harm can
demonstrate reprehensibility, but can just as easily demonstrate negligence. Use the
facts of State Fam as an example. The plaintiff claimed that its insurer mishandled
the plaintiffs litigation, and the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of other
insureds who were similarly injured."s It is possible the insurer's employee could
have just made poor decisions in defending many insureds' legal claims. Again,
many insureds were injured, but the insurer's mental state was no more than
negligent, it did not act reprehensibly." It is possible to negligently injure many
without also acting reprehensibly."
What the plaintiff actually wanted to demonstrate from the evidence of
nonparty harm, however, was the insurer's "evil intent"-that the insurer sought to
take advantage of its low-income insureds and systematically mishandled the legal
claims against many of them." If true, this evidence of nonparty harm would show
that the insurer had a plan to take advantage of its low-income insureds. That plan
would be evidence of the insurer's reprehensibility."
A product defect claim provides another good example. The plaintiff can
establish that a handsaw lacking a guard is defective by showing the risks resulting
from the design outweigh the costs of adding a guard. If available, the plaintiff will
likely present evidence of nonparty harm to demonstrate the extent of risk resulting
from the design without a guard, of which the defendant should have been aware.
This evidence of nonparty harm shows that the product was defective and that the
defendant, essentially, negligently injured many. Negligently injuring many,
however, is negligently injuring many-, it is not acting with evil intent or recklessly
disregarding others' safety.
The existence of that nonparty harm could show reprehensibility, however.
Suppose that some of those nonparties complained to the defendant of severe
injuries suffered while using the saw as designed. Still, the defendant continued to

can act more reprehensibly in causing economic harm by having an evil intent, but only recklessly
disregard a probable chance of physical injury. Victims being financially vulnerable suggests that the
defendant had an evil intent, but not necessarily. Only the last factor-whether "the harm was the result
of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident" is directly relevant to the defendant's mental
state. Id. (citing BMW 517 U.S. at 576-77).
94 Id. at 422 (emphasis added).
95 Id. at 415.
9' Sce id. at 422-23.
9 See id.; see also supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
98 See Stae Farm, 538 U.S. at 415; see abo supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
9 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422-24.
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sell the saw as-is. The defendant's still selling the saw as-is despite knowing of the
high probability of severe injury is likely reckless and thus reprehensible.
In addition to the Court's own original descriptions of reprehensibility and
factual examples, theories supporting the imposition of punitive damages show that
nonparty harm may or may not demonstrate reprehensibility. The current
dominant theory justifying the imposition of punitive damages is private redress
theory.'"0 Generally speaking, private redress theory concludes that punitive
damage awards must be limited to redressing the defendant's disrespect of the
plaintiff."o' Thus, "[t]he reprehensibility inquiry does not examine the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct in the abstract. Rather, . . . the only
'reprehensibility' that matters is the reprehensibility of the private tort-the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant's wrongful disregard of plaintiffs rights."" 2 For
example, "evidence of previous, known harm to others helps to demonstrate the
reprehensibility of the decision to go ahead and sell the defective product to the
0
plaintiff.""
Harm to nonparties may make the defendant's general conduct
reprehensible," but the general conduct is not the conduct to be punished by
punitive damages." Instead, punitive damages punish the private wrong
committed to the plaintiff, and nonparty harm may or may not demonstrate the
reprehensibility of that private wrong."06
ii. Enabling Unintentional Piho Mornis Violations

10
Private redress theory has been introduced mainly by Professors Benjamin Zipursky and
Anthony Sebok. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory ofPunitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105,
156-157 (2005) [hereinafter Zipursky, Theor]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages,
and Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 1777-80 (2012) [hereinafter Zipursky, Palsgraf]; Anthony
J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 959-61, 1006-23, 1028
(2007). Professor Thomas Colby has also offered a theory focusing on the private wrong that is very
similar to private redress theory. Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple PunishmentProblem: Punitive
Damages as Punishment for Individua4 Pivate Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 613-43, 674-77
(2003); Colby, supra note 31, at 414-66.
'o' See Colby, supranote 100, at 674-77; Colby, supm note 31, at 441-43; Sebok, supranote 100,
at 1028-29; Zipursky, Theory, supranote 100, at 156-57; Zipursky, Palsgraf, supra note 100, 1777-80.
102 Colby, supra note 31, at 465; see Zipursky, Palsgraf, supra note 100, at 1788 ("Admitting
evidence of nonparty harm will generally be quite different from punishing for harm to nonparties when
the court admits evidence of nonparty harm for its relevance to the reprehensibility of the defendants
wrong to the plaintiffherselfbut it will be virtually the same (as punishing for harm to nonparties) if
admitted for its relevance to the reprehensibility of the defendant's wrongs to nonparties."); see also
Sebok, supra note 100, at 1032-33 (explaining that evidence of nonparty harm should be introduced
only to the extent that it can be connected to the disrespect that the plaintiff suffered).
103 Colby, supm note 31, at 466.
1o4 Id. at 465 ("Whether the defendant's conduct harmed or threatened harm to the general
public .. .is relevant only in determining the reprehensibility of the public wrong, which is not at issue
in punitive damages cases.").
'0s See id at 466.
"n Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355 (2007).
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The Philip Moris majority incorrectly equated nonparty harm and
reprehensibility.' 7 Not surprisingly, lower courts have repeated that mistake.
For example, lower courts have generally admitted evidence of nonparty harm
because of its assumed relevance to reprehensibility. 0 s Lower courts are also
repeating the PhibpMonis majority's mistake when instructing juries. Specifically,
some states have adopted a Philp Monis punitive damage jury instruction that
assumes relevance of nonparty harm and expressly gives the jury permission to
consider nonparty harm as evidence of reprehensibility. For instance, Utah's
instruction includes: "When determining the degree of reprehensibility, you may
consider evidence of similar conduct by [name of defendant] toward other people
who are not in this lawsuit."'"' Similarly, Oregon's instruction explains that
evidence of nonparty harm "may be considered in evaluating the reprehensibility of
[the] defendant's conduct."'10 These instructions are still permissive, as a jury has
discretion whether to even award punitive damages.' But should the jury choose
to do so, these instructions tell the jury that the presence of nonparty harm
increases the level of reprehensibility.
Some states have adopted a more toned-down instruction about nonparty harm
and reprehensibility. Oklahoma's Php Monrisinstruction, for example, states that
"[c]onduct that risks harm to many may be more reprehensible than conduct that
risks harm to only a few."112 But even the suggestion that nonparty harm can
demonstrate reprehensibility is misleading, it does not also inform the jury that
nonparty harm may not actually show reprehensibility. There is no greater chance
that nonparty harm demonstrates reprehensibility than negligence, but the
suggested jury instruction does not indicate so. Instead, the suggested jury

'0oId. at 355-57.

108 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Rowatt, 244 P.3d 765, 783-85 (Nev. 2010) (denying error based
on
consideration of others defendant injured); Saffos v. Avaya Inc., 16 A.3d 1076, 1085-88 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2011) (denying error based on consideration of the impact of defendant's conduct on its
other older workers); Duncan v. Ford Motor Co., 682 S.E.2d 877, 887-88 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009)
(denying error based on admission of defendant's other vehicle recalls); Coalson v. Canchola, 754
S.E.2d 525, 529-31 (Va. 2014) (denying error based on consideration of history of drunk driving).

" CIVIL MODELJURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS

§ CV2031

(2d ed.), https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji/ [https://perma.cc/8K38-XH3G] (follow "Civil
Instructions hyperlink; then "2000 - Tort Damages" hyperlink) (last modified Aug. 30, 2016)
[hereinafter UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
no OR. STATE BAR, OREGON UNIF. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS

§

75.02B, LEXIS (2016)

[hereinafter OR. JURY INSTRUCTIONS]. The Utah and Oregon instructions cited here are still
permissive, allowing the jury to consider evidence of nonparty harm, but not mandating that
consideration. See id.; UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 109. This is because the jury has
discretion whether to award punitive damages in the first place. See infra note 111. If thejury chooses to
do so, however, these instructions tell the jury to consider evidence of nonparty harm-regardless of its
relevance to reprehensibility.
n1 Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,432 (1994).
112 OKLA. STATE COURTS NETWORK, OKLAHOMA JURY INSTRUCTIONS- CIVIL

http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CitelD=472755
U5VH] [hereinafter OKLA. JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (emphasis added).

§

5.9 (2014),

[https://perma.cc/8HBJ-
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instruction could easily mislead the jury into believing the evidence of nonparty
harm demonstrates reprehensibility, even when it may not.
Incorrect assumptions that nonparty harm demonstrates reprehensibility
increase the chance of unintentional Php Moris violations. If the jury assumes
nonparty harm demonstrates reprehensibility-even when it does not-and
increases the award based on it, then the jury has likely punished for that nonparty
harm. And punishing for nonparty harm, of course, violates Phik Mornis."3 This
type of Phibp Morris is unintentional; the jury thinks it is following the law and
increasing the award based on reprehensibility. Even if unintentional though, the
resulting punitive damages award is unconstitutional.114
Lower courts need to be conscious of possible unintentional violations of Philio
Morris-violations that occur when the jury misunderstands that reprehensibility is
a mental state: the same misunderstanding the Phibp Morris majority made. Some
lower courts have become more conscious of unintentional violations of Php
Moris. One example is Lompe v. Sunridge Partners, LLC, in which the Tenth
Circuit acknowledged that nonparty harm can show reprehensibility, but excluded
the evidence because the defendant did not know of the nonparty harm. 1 5
Similarly, a Vermont trial court excluded evidence of abuse of nonparties which the
defendant did not know about, but admitted evidence of abuse of nonparties which
the defendant knew about."' Other lower courts need to follow this lead in order
to help the jury avoid unintentionally violating Ph@o Monis.
B. EnsuringtheJuryAsks the Right Question
Problems in awarding punitive damages post-Philio Monis do not end,
however, with a better understanding of the reprehensibility-punishment
distinction. Courts have also struggled with how to implement Philip
Monis-how to ensure that the jury considers evidence of nonparty harm only for
reprehensibility purposes.
Although the Court had previously mandated procedural protections-judicial
review"' and the Gore/State Farn out-of-state conduct jury instruction's-the
tone of the Court's mandate in Phl Morriswas new:
Given the risks of unfairness that we have mentioned, it is
constitutionalfy important for a court to provide assurance that the jury
113
114

PhihpMoris, 549 U.S. at 356-57.

Id. at 354-55.

Lompe v. Sunridge Partners, LLC, 818 F.3d 1041, 1055-57 (10th Cir. 2016).
Keppler v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, No. S0930-05 CnC, 2009 WL 6557356, at
*2-*4 (Vt. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2009). The unreported abuse had limited relevance, whereas the reported
abuse was "highly relevant to whether the Diocese acted with reasonable care and/or recklessly in its
supervision of' the priest. Id. at *2-*3.
".. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991).
us State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996).
115

116
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will ask the right question, not the wrong one. And given the risks of
arbitrariness, the concern for adequate notice, and the risk that punitive
damages can, in practice, impose one State's (or one jury's) policies (e.g.,
banning cigarettes) upon other States-all of which accompany awards
that, today, may be many times the size of such awards in the 18th and
19th centuries-it is particularly important that States avoid procedure
that unnecessarily deprives juries of proper legal guidance." 9
It is constitutionally important to provide an assurance, and to help juries
understand the difference between reprehensibility and punishment. "[S]tate courts
cannot authorize procedures that create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk of
any such confusion occurring. "120 Moreover:
[W]here the risk of that misunderstanding is a significant one-because,
for instance, of the sort of evidence that was introduced at trial or the
kinds of argument the plaintiff made to the jury-a court, upon request,
must protect against that risk. Although the States have some flexibility
to determine what kind of procedures they will implement, federal
constitutional law obligates them to provide some form of protection in
appropriate cases.'
Both the extent of the explanation of the need for a procedural protection and
the Court's tone were unprecedented.
Lower courts have not, however, been motivated to adopt unprecedented
protections. Practically, only two options exist: "[T]rying to get juries to ask the
right question[s] means either excluding potentially confusing evidence and
argument, or expressly advising the jury on the right questions in the form of jury
instructions."122
The existing mechanisms to comply with Phibp Monris are insufficient. The
current rule governing the exclusion of evidence is unlikely to lead to the exclusion
of nonparty harm. And many reasons exist to doubt the efficacy of a limiting
instruction. Plus, dependence on limiting instructions has hampered detection of
possible PAip Monris violations.
This section criticizes the mechanisms courts are currently using to provide the
23
more
required assurance and suggests three alternative mechanisms' -a

n' Philp Mornis, 549 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added) (citing BAW 517 U.S. at 594-95 (1996)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
120 Id. at 357.
121 Id
122 Scheuerman &Franze, supranote 64, at 1165 (footnote omitted).
"' I am not suggesting bifurcation as a possible mechanism. Bifurcation is a popular, supposed prodefendant reform, but it likely would not protect defendants from Phi~o Monis-relatedissues. But see
Wilson v. City of Hazelwood, 628 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1070 (E.D. Mo. 2008) ("[B]ifurcation of the trial
precluded the jury's hearing evidence which could have been prejudicial in the first phase and facilitated
its hearing evidence in the second phase which was relevant to the jury's consideration of the amount of
punitive damages."). In determining the amount of punitive damages, it is clear that the jury can
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exclusion-friendly rule to evaluate the admissibility of evidence of nonparty harm,
explanatory jury instructions, and judicial review consistent with the required de
novo standard of review for the constitutionality of punitive damage awards.
i. Excluding Evidence of Nonparty Harm
The current, applicable evidentiary rule does not sufficiently protect defendants
from Phihp Monis violations. This is because exclusion is unlikely under the
admission-friendly Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which mandates exclusion only if
the evidence's prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.12 4
Courts should instead use a rule akin to Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), under
which evidence is inadmissible if the evidence's prejudicial effect merely outweighs
its probative value.1 25
1. The Insufficiency of Rule 403
The current Rule under which defendants could seek to exclude evidence of
nonparty harm based Philp Monis is Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Evidence is
relevant, and admissible, if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence," assuming "the fact is of
consequence in determining the action."1 26 Still, relevant evidence is inadmissible
under Rule 403 if the evidence's "probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following- unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence."" Philip Monis explains the prejudicial effect of evidence of nonparty
harm-that a jury may punish the defendant for causing nonparty harm and thus
violate the defendant's constitutional rights. 128 Juror confusion is obviously possible
too-attempting to distinguish between permissibly evaluating the reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct versus punishing for nonparty harm is not simple.1 29
The argument for exclusion under Rule 403 has worked only a handful of
times. One example is a federal district court that found the "subtle distinction"

consider evidence of nonparty harm assuming its relevance to reprehensibility. Phibp4 Morris, 549 U.S.
at 357. There is no possible separation of evidence that could thus protect defendants. Regardless, many
have questioned whether bifurcation really provides any protections for defendants. See Stephan
Landsman et al., Be Carefid What You Wish For The ParadoxicalEffects of Bitiurcating Claims for
PunitiveDamages, 1998 WIs. L. REv. 297, 335 (1998) (finding that "defendants who lose on liability
substantially increase the risk that punitive damages will be assessed against them if the case is
bifurcated[]" and that "not only does the incidence of punitive liability increase, but the size of the
punitive award grows substantially if the case is bifurcated").
124 FED. R. EvID. 403.
' See FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
126 FED. R. EviD. 401.
127 FED. R. EVID. 403.
12 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355-57 (2007).
u See, e.g., id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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30
between reprehensibility and punishment "difficult [to] implement in practice.'
The court found it "imprudent to admit the evidence proffered by plaintiff because
of the practical difficulties raised by crafting a jury instruction that properly adheres
to the Supreme Court's holding in Philip Morris.""' The court also held that the
evidence of nonparty harm was irrelevant to reprehensibility because of
dissimilarities.' 3 2
Another example is a Vermont trial court that recognized that nonparty harm
33
The court granted a church's
does not always demonstrate reprehensibility.'
motion in limine to exclude evidence of instances of child abuse not reported to the
church because the evidence's prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its
probative effect.1 34 Te "emotional weight" made the evidence very prejudicial, and
the probative value was limited due to the church's lack of awareness."s The court
also directly addressed Ph@io Monis-

Although actual harm to others may be relevant to the issue of how
reprehensible the Defendant's conduct was, that does not mean such
evidence is necessary. As the court in Phip Morrisnoted, the likelihood
of a jury using the harm to non-parties as a basis of an award to punish
for that harm is high. "[W]here the risk of that misunderstanding is a
significant one--because, for instance, of the sort of evidence" at issue,
"a court, upon request, must protect against that risk." The United States
Supreme Court has directed that "courts cannot authorize procedures
that create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk of . . . confusion

occurring" such that the jury awards punitive damages to punish for the
acts against others. Given the emotional nature of the issues, the court
concludes that presentation of evidence about the unreported abuse of
other children would create an "unreasonable and unnecessary risk" of
136
the jury making an award on an improper basis.

13 Dugan v. Nance, No. CV 11-8145-CAS, 2013 WL 4479289, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2013);
see abo In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-MD-2543, 2015 WL 8270427
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2015), at *3 (excluding evidence of the insufficiency of repairs the defendant
performed on other vehicles); Williams v. City of Phila., No. 13-207, 2014 WL 1632218 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 23, 2014), at *1, 4 n.7, *5, *(excluding evidence of prior bad acts because of cumulative nature);
Sadler v. Advanced Bionics, LLC, No. 3:11-CV-00450-TBR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46637 (W.D.
Ky. Apr. 1, 2013), at * 2, *8 (excluding evidence of other filed or pending lawsuits); EEOC v. Crst Van
Expedited, Inc., No. 07-CV-95-LRR, 2013 WL 321021 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 28, 2013), at *1 (excluding
evidence of nonparty harm); Schilf v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. CIV 07-4015, 2010 WL 3909909 (D.S.D.
Sept. 30, 2010), at *6-7 (excluding evidence related to one of defendant's other prescription drugs).
131
32

Dugan, 2013 WL 4479289, at *1.

Id.
.. See Keppler v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, No. S0930-05 CnC, 2009 WL 6557356,
at *3-*4 (Vt. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2009).
1

134
135

Id. at *2-*4.

136

Id. at *3-*4 (citations omitted) (quoting Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007)).

Id.
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Plus, the trial court found the evidence unnecessary to show reprehensibility.'
The risk to other children was "obvious without any need for such specific and
emotionally charged evidence related to particular children," and the evidence was
essentially cumulative given that the court did admit evidence of incidents that
were reported to the church.' Evidence of abuse reported to the church was
"highly relevant to whether the Diocese acted with reasonable care and/or
recklessly in its supervision of" the priest."' Although the prejudicial effect was
similar to the prejudicial effect of evidence of instances not reported to the church,
the probative value of the evidence of instances reported to the church outweighed
their prejudicial effect."4
But very few examples of exclusion under 403 exist despite ten years passing
since Phlp MorniS.141 This is likely partly due to the Court's broad declarations
equating nonparty harm with reprehensibility. It is also likely partly due to the
rule's requiring "substantial outweigh[ing]"-exclusion is proper only if the
prejudicial effect "substantially outweigh[s]" the probative value.142 It is difficult to
substantially outweigh the probative value of nonparty harm given nonparty harm's
relevance to many issues. Reprehensibility is the obvious example of one such issue.
But evidence of nonparty harm can also be relevant to demonstrate facts not
relevant to punitive damages. It can help demonstrate the defendant's intent, a
necessary element of an intentional tort.' 43 Or, nonparty harm could demonstrate
multiple elements in a claim based on a product defect, including a design defect, a
warning defect, and causation.'" The probative value of evidence of nonparty harm
is unlikely to be substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect, making exclusion
unlikely under 403.

137

3
139

Id.
Id. at *2, *4.
Id. at *2.

140Id.

Pilp Mornis has, unsurprisingly, also appeared in discovery disputes. See, e.g., In re E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Injury Litig., No. 2:13-md-2433, 2016 WL 5884964, at *5 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 7, 2016) (allowing discovery of nonparty harm because of its relevance to reprehensibility);
Lyon v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., No. CIV. 09-5070-JLV, 2011 WL 124629, at *11-*14 (D.S.D. Jan.
14, 2011) (requiring defendant to produce documents related to other litigation); Fullbright v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CIV-09-297-D, 2010 WL 300436, at *1, *5 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 20,
2010) (concerning discovery request for complaints filed by others insureds); Lopez v. Watchtower Bible
&Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 156, 177-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (allowing discovery of
any child abuse occurring after the plaintiffs injury due to relevance to reprehensibility); In re GMAC
Direct Ins. Co., No. 09-10-00493-CV, 2010 WL 5550672, at *1-.*2 (Tex. App. Dec. 30, 2010) (ruling
that Phlbp Monis does not enable unfettered discovery into the general business practices of
defendants).
42
1 FED. R EvID. 403.
143 See Benjamin C. Zipursky, PunitiveDamagesAfterPhilip Morris USA v. Williams, 44 Ct. Rev.
J. Am. Judges Ass'n, 134, 147 (2007).
1" See id.
141
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2. A Better Balancing Test to Admissibility of Evidence of Nonparty Harm
Notably, not all evidence is evaluated under Rule 403. One exception is Rule
609(a), which governs the admission of prior convictions to impeach a criminal
defendant.1 45 Former convictions for felonies are admissible against a criminal
defendant only if the prosecution can demonstrate that "the probative value of the
evidence ... outweighs the prejudicial effect."'" Although this balancing test does
not guarantee that convictions will be inadmissible, it provides a better chance at
exclusion than Rule 403 given that the prejudicial effect need only
outweigh-instead of substantially outweigh-the probative value.
Many reasons exist for the more exclusion-friendly 609(a). Mainly, "juries may
be inclined to overweigh character evidence."1 47 For instance, "the jury may ignore
the issues and convict because evidence of prior conviction suggests the accused is a
bad person who, if not guilty of the crime charged, may be deserving of
punishment for something else."' 48 The evidence may also encourage the jury to
"discount the burden of proof on the prosecution."'49 Or, the "jury might also use
the evidence of past crimes to infer that the accused committed the crime charged
in this case, an inference usually [otherwise] prohibited."'s
Of course, we could use jury instructions to try to prevent the jury's
impermissible considerations of past convictions. The court could instruct the jury
to consider the evidence only to judge the defendant's honesty. But "[j]ury
instructions to refrain from drawing such improper inferences may be futile."'s
The futility of jury instructions is also concerning because of the potential
constitutional implications of the jury's improper consideration of prior felony
convictions.'152 This improper consideration itself would not actually violate the
defendant's constitutional rights.s3 Rather, concern existed that, in order to avoid
the introduction of his prior felony convictions, a defendant would choose not to
testify despite his constitutional right to do so. 154 Instead of using a limiting
instruction that could disincentivize the exercise of a constitutional right, a
balancing test more likely to lead to the exclusion of the evidence was created.
The reasons for a more exclusion-friendly rule for prior convictions to impeach
a witness also apply to evidence of nonparty harm. The jury may give evidence of
145 FED. R.
146 id.
147 Victor

EVID. 609.

Gold, Impeachment by ConvictionEvidence:JudicidlDiscretionand the PoldcsofRule
609, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2295,2313 (1994).
148 Id
Notably, if the evidence of prior convictions is introduced as evidence
of a "motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident,"
exclusion would still be evaluated under Rule 403. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
149 Gold, supranote 147, at 2313 (footnote omitted).
1so Id. at 2314 (footnotes omitted).
151 id.
152 See id. at 2314-19.
15. Id. at 2314-15.
154

d
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nonparty harm too much weight. For example, the jury may use the evidence to
conclude that the defendant is a bad person or entity deserving of punishment
regardless of its conduct in injuring the plaintiff who actually brought suit, which
State Farm prohibits.'s Evidence of nonparty harm is arguably more prejudicial
than a prior conviction, which involved an actual conviction. The defendant may
not actually be liable in tort to nonparties, but the jury is able to consider his
conduct and may conclude that the defendant should be punished regardless of
how the defendant injured the actual plaintiff.
Further, the possible futility of a limiting instruction for the
reprehensibility-punishment distinction has constitutional implications.1'5 6 If the
jury instruction does not work and the jury punishes the defendant for causing
nonparty harm, the award violates the defendant's constitutional rights.1 5 This is

an actual constitutional violation.'s This is of greater concern than how the
admission of prior convictions may disincentivize the exercise of a constitutional
right.
Applying this modified balancing test to evidence of nonparty harm would also
be more consistent with the Court's language in Phlp Monis. The Court
mandated that the court must "provide some form of protection" if the jury's "risk
of that misunderstanding is a significant one."s 9 A significant risk is likely less than
a substantial risk. Thus, the prejudicial effect-here, the risk of punishment of
nonparty harm-should not have to substantially outweigh the probative value for
exclusion to be proper. Instead, exclusion should be proper if the prejudicial effect
merely outweighs the evidence's probative value.
Obviously, some evidence of nonparty harm will still be admissible under this
modified balancing test because the probative value of evidence of nonparty harm is
strong.'60 But this test itself provides additional protection because the prejudicial
effect no longer needs to substantially outweigh that strong probative value for
exclusion to be proper. Instead, exclusion is proper even if the prejudicial
effect-which will be strong, given the constitutional violation-merely outweighs
that also strong probative value.
ii. Better Jury Instructions
Many courts have used jury instructions to comply with Phlp Mois, with
some states amending their model instructions to include a Phlp Monis
instruction. Many reasons exist, however, to question whether a limiting
"s State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422-23 (2003) (explaining that
punitive damages should "punish[] for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for [the defendant's]
being an unsavory individual or business").
" See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,353-55 (2007).
157

Id

" Id. at 357.
See Zipursky, supranote 144, at 147.

160

2017-ot8
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instruction provides the "assurance" that Philp Moris mandates. To improve the
efficacy of a Philip Morris limiting instruction, courts should also explain to the
jury how evidence of nonparty harm can demonstrate reprehensibility and why
punishment for nonparty harm is impermissible.
1. Current Popularity
Just as many scholars predicted,' 6 ' most courts have turned to jury instructions
to attempt to comply with the Court's Philp Monis mandate. In fact, fourteen
states adopted a Philip Monis model jury instruction.' 62
Some states had already incorporated the guideposts into their instructions and
then added a Phihp Monris instruction. The resulting instructions then, possibly
confusingly, combine the reprehensibility guidepost and the reprehensibility161 See, e.g., Scheuerman & Franze, supra note 64, at 1207; Sebok, supranote 100, at 1032;
Zipursky, Palsgraf, supranote 100, at 1786-87.
Professor Garrett recently claimed that punitive damages were one area where a constitutional right
has displaced evidence law, such that in State Farm and Phibp Morris the Court "emphatically
intervened in evidence law, cautioning that jurors be instructed on not punishing defendants for out-ofstate conduct or conduct harming nonparty victims." Brandon L. Garrett, ConstitutionalLaw and the
Law of Evidence, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 57, 74 (2015). Professor Garrett's analysis of the Court's
involvement with punitive damages jury instructions, however, is a bit exaggerated. The Court has not
been fervent in requiring jury instructions. The Court did it in passing in State Farmwith respect to
punishment of out-of-state conduct, see State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422-23, and in Phihp Moris, the
Court did not even require a jury instruction. 549 U.S. at 357. Professor Garrett likely is correct,
however, in his suggestion that the Court may favor regulating punitive damages through evidence law
instead of mandating ratio-a reform more appropriately required by the legislature. Garrett, supra, at
74-75. The Court is not just regulating punitive damages through evidence law, however, it is also
altering substantive tort law by redefining the scope of punishment.
162
ALA. PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM-CIVIL, ALABAMA PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL §§ 11.03-11.04, Westlaw (3d ed. 2016) [hereinafter ALA. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS]; ARK. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, ARKANSAS
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL §§ 2218-2218A, Westlaw (2016) [hereinafter ARK. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS]; JOHN M. DINSE ET AL., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL: BOOK OF
APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 14.71, LEXIS (9th ed. 2003) [hereinafter CAL. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS]; IOWA JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., IOWA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 210.1,
LEXIS (2016) [hereinafter IOWA JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; DONALD G. ALEXANDER, MAINE JURY
INSTRUCTION MANUAL § 7-114, LEXIS (2017); COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES,
MNN. DIsT. JUDGES ASS'N, MINNESOTA PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES-CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTION GUIDES § 94.10, Westlaw (6th ed. 2017) [hereinafter MINN. JURY INSTRUCTIONS];
Mo. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MISSOURI APPROVED JURY

INSTRUCTIONS (Civil) § 10.01, Westlaw (7th ed. 2017) [hereinafter MO. JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; CIVIL
SUBCOMM. OF THE STATE BAR OF NEV., NEVADA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 12PD.2, LEXIS
(2017) [hereinafter NEV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; N.M. SUPREME COURT, NEW MEXICO UNIFORM

JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL

§§

13-1827 to 13-1827A, LEXIS (2015) [hereinafter N.M. JURY

INSTRUCTIONS]; COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASS'N OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES,
NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 2:278, Westlaw (2016) [hereinafter N.Y. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS]; STATE BAR ASS'N OF N.D., NORTH DAKOTA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-

CIVIL §§ C 72.00, 72.07 LEXIS (2016) [hereinafter N.D. JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; OHIO JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § CV 315.37, LEXIS [hereinafter OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; OKLA. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supranote 112, § 5.9; OR. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 110, § 75.02B.
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punishment distinction. For example, Utah's model instructions explain the
reprehensibility guidepost: "In determining the amount of punitive damages that
should be awarded, you should consider the reprehensibility of [name of

defendant]'s conduct. Greaterreprehensibiltymayjusti a higherpunitive damage
awardwhile lesserreprehensibiltymayjustir a lower amount"'6 Further, "[w]hen
determining the degree of reprehensibility, you may consider evidence of similar
conduct by [name of defendant] toward other people who are not in this
lawsuit." 64 The instruction then includes the Php Monis prohibition
"[H]owever, I caution you that this evidence is to be considered only to determine
reprehensibility. The actual harm to other people is not the measure of punitive
damages in this case." 6 s Similarly, another instruction explains that the jury "may
award punitive damages for the purpose of punishing [name of defendant] only for
[harm] [attempted harm] [damage] to [name of plaintiffl, [but] may not award
punitive damages for the purpose of punishing harm or attempted harm to other
people."' 6 6
Oregon's instructions also include both the reprehensibility guidepost and the
reprehensibility-punishment distinction:
There is no fixed standard for determining the amount of punitive
damages .

..

. If you decide to award punitive damages, you should

consider all of the following ...

in determining the amount

(a) How reprehensible was that defendant's conduct, considering the
67
nature of that conduct and the defendant's motive?

"

Evidence has been received of harm suffered by persons other than the
plaintiff as a result of the defendant's conduct This evidence may be
considered in evaluating the reprehensibility of defendant's conduct
However, you may not award punitive damages to punish the defendant
for harm caused to persons other than the plaintiff.
Alabama's,'169 California's, 170 Iowa's,171 Nevada's,1 72 New Yor's,'1 73 North
Dakota's,'1 74 Oklahoma's,'17 and the Eighth Circuit's1 7 6 model instructions include
both the reprehensibility guidepost and a Phip Monis instruction.1

16

3

UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 109,

§ CV2030.

(emphasis added).

1- Id. § CV2031.
16s
1

Id.

- Id. § CV2028.

167 OR. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note
168 Id.
75.02B.

§

110, at

§ 75.02.

169 ALA. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162, at §§ 11.03-11.04 (instructing the jury to base the
amount of punitive damages on "the character and degree of" the defendant's "wrongful conduct," and
allowing the jury to consider nonparty harm to determine the level of reprehensibility of that conduct,
but prohibiting the award of punitive damages based on the defendant's conduct to others than the
plaintiff).
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Other states' instructions lack the guideposts, but integrate Pihp Mois.
Arkansas courts, for example, instruct juries: evidence of nonparty harm "may be
considered by you only for the purpose of determining the degree of
reprehensibility of (defendant)'s conduct. You may not use evidence of harm to
persons other than (plaintiff) to punish (defendant)."17

1

Minnesota,1 7 9 Missouri, 1s0

and Ohio' have similar Philip Mois instructions. Other states did not adopt a
model instruction, but did include a note about Phio Momis within their model
instructions. For instance, Texas's model instructions include commentary that if
evidence of nonparty harm is introduced, "the jury should be instructed that it may

170 CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162, at §§ 14.71-14.72 (explaining the jury should
consider the defendant's level of reprehensibility in determining the amount of punitive damages, and
that the defendant's "practice of engaging in, and profiting from wrongful conduct [occurring in
California] similar to that which injured the plaintiff" is relevant to that level of reprehensibility, but not
to include any amount in the punitive damage award for injuries to any one other than the plaintiff).
171 IOWAJURY INSTRUCTIONS, supo note 162, at § 210.1 (explaining that the jury should consider
"f[the nature of the defendant's conduct" in determining the amount of punitive damages and allowing
the jury to "consider harm to others in determining the nature of defendant's conduct," but prohibiting
the jury from awarding "punitive damages to punish the defendant for harm caused to others").
NEV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162, at § 12PD.2 (instructing the jury that in
determining the amount of punitive damages, it should consider "[t]he degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct" and that nonparty harm is relevant to "the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct," but that the jury cannot use evidence of nonparty harm to award punitive damages to the
plaintiff for "conduct injuring others who are not parties to this litigation").
" N.Y. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162, at § 2:278 (instructing the jury to consider the
nature and reprehensibility of what [the defendant] did" in determining the amount of punitive
damages and explaining that although the jury can "consider the harm to individuals or entities other
than [the] plaintiff ... in determining the extent to which [the defendant]'s conduct was reprehensible,
[it] may not add a specific amount to [the] punitive damages award to punish [defendant] for the harm
[defendant] caused to others").
174 N.D. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162, at §§ C 72.00, C 72.07.
175 OKLA. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 112, at § 5.9 (allowing the jury to consider "[t]he
seriousness of the hazard to the public arising from [Defendant]'s misconduct" in determining the
amount of punitive damages and to "consider evidence of actual harm to others in determining the
seriousness of the hazard to the public and thus whether the conduct that harmed the plaintiff was
particularly reprehensible or bad" because "[c]onduct that risks harm to many may be more
reprehensible than conduct that risks harm to only a few," but explaining that the jury cannot punish the
defendant "directly on account of harms that [Defendant] may have caused to others").
7
. EIGHTH CIRCUIT MODEL CIVILJURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.72 (2014).
177 Other states that have adopted a Phip Mornis instruction do not instruct the jury that the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct should determine the amount of punitive damages, despite
the Supreme Court's first guidepost; regardless, those other states' instructions still direct jurors to
consider nonparty harm in evaluating the defendant's reprehensibility but not as a basis for punishment.
E.g., ARK. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162, at §§ 2218-2218A; MO. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra
note 162, at § 10.01; N.M. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162, at §§ 13-1827-13-1827A; OHIO
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162, at § CV 315.37.
178 ARK. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162, at § 2218A.
179 MINN. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162, at § 94.10
..oMO. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supranote 162, at § 10.01.
s' OHIOJURY INSTRUCTIONS, supr note 162, at § CV 315.37.
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not punish a defendant for the harm the defendant's conduct allegedly caused to
other persons who are not parties to the litigation."' 82
Whether the state adopted a model instruction or just included a note about
Phihp Monis in the commentary to their instructions, the language tends to copy
the Court's broad language in Phihp Monis itself-that the jury can consider the
evidence for purposes of reprehensibility, but cannot punish the defendant for
causing it.'

2. Inherent Concerns About the Efficacy of Limiting Instructions
Although courts, including the Supreme Court, matter-of-factly presume that
juries follow their instructions,' 84 doubts regarding the efficacy of limiting
instructions are widespread."s Justice Jackson famously expressed his doubt: "The
naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury
... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."' 86 Judge Learned Hand
similarly noted, "[n]obody can indeed fail to doubt whether the caution is
effective"'" and that limiting instructions require the jury to perform "mental

182

STATE BAR COMM. ON PATTERN JURY CHARGES, TEXAS PATIERN JURY CHARGES-CIVIL

§ 28.7, LEXIS (2016); see also SUPREME COURT OF COLO., COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
CIVIL TRIALS § 5:4, LEXIS (2017) (explaining that jury should be instructed regarding
reprehensibility-punishment distinction); KAN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, JUDICIAL COUNCIL PATTERN
INSTRUCTIONS FOR KAN., PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FOR KANSAS-CIVIL § 171.44, LEXIS (4th ed.
2012) (explaining the reprehensibility-punishment distinction); 2-39 JOHN S. PALMORE &DONALD P.
CETRULO, KENTUCKY INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES-CIVIL § 39.15, LEXIS (2017) (explaining that
punitive damages must reflect "the degree to which the defendant's conduct is found reprehensible,
damaging the plaintiff himself as opposed to the public at large"); COMM. ON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES § 810.98,

LEXIS (2016) (explaining the reprehensibility-punishment distinction); MICHIE Co., 2B-2B-1
INSTRUCTIONS FOR VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA § 26-132, LEXIS (2016) (same); WIS. CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL §§ 1707.1-1707.2 (2015)
(same).

.8. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 356-57 (2007).
`4 E.g., Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987) ("We normally presume that a jury will
follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it . . . ." (citing

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987))); United States v. Gardner, 396 F.3d 987, 993 (8th
Cir. 2005) ("We presume the jury followed the court's instruction to disregard a comment by the

prosecutor." (citing United States v. Flute, 363 F.3d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 2004))); United States v. Givan,
320 F.3d 452, 462 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[I]t is a basic tenet of our jurisprudence that a jury is presumed to
have followed the instructions the court gave it . . . ." (citing United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 96

(3d Cir. 1991))).
..s See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the jury as Other, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 407, 408 (2013) ("There are two well-known facts about evidentiary instructions .... The second
is that they do not work"); see also Linda J. Demaine, In Search ofan Anti-Elephant: Confrontingthe
Hunan Inabilty to Forger Inadmissible Evidence, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99 (2008). Professor
Sklansky summarizes the criticism of limiting instructions throughout his article. See Sklansky, supra,

passim.

186 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
187

United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 1948).
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gymnastic[s] which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else."'
Scholars have presented three main reasons to doubt the efficacy of limiting
instructions: common sense, the story model of how juries interpret evidence, and
the results of mock juror studies. All three reasons to doubt also apply to a Phip
Monis instruction.
Common sense dictates that it is difficult for a juror to hear evidence, but then
consider it only for a limited purpose.' In short, you cannot unring a bell, uncrack
the egg."' The jury is supposed to ignore the most obvious purpose of the evidence
and consider it for a less obvious purpose. 9' This task itself, of using information
for one purpose but not another, is "cognitively complex."1 92 Limiting instructions
"impose demands that are likely to be to be difficult for jurors . . . to apply as the
93
law directs. "1
That cognitively complex task could be even more difficult when the
evidence is that the defendant's conduct also harmed nonparties.1 94 The
punishment instinct is strong, and a limiting instruction may not be enough to
quell it.19s Academics specifically questioned jurors' ability to follow the State Farm
out-of-state conduct reprehensibility-punishment distinction; it "may be
understandable, but using the evidence of injury to others appropriately probably
demands superhuman capabilities that judges as well as jurors lack."19 6
The story model explains that "juries assess evidence holistically" and "reason
recursively, with each piece of evidence influencing the constructed narrative.""
Arguably, it is difficult for jurors to follow later instructions to not evaluate a piece
of evidence in a certain way, forcing them to reconstruct the narrative.' 9 s The story
model also fits in well with Professors Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Cass

...
Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
1s9 SeegenerallyDemaine,supra note 185 (discussing juror's inability to forget inadmissible
information and offering a novel method to combat the issue).
`0 See Sklansky, supra note 185, at 414 (discussing the common-sense objections to the efficacy of
limiting instructions).
19 See Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The "Kettleful ofLaw"in Real
JuryDeiberations:Successes, Failures,and Next Steps, 106 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1537, 1604 (2012).
192 _d
193 Id.
194 See

id
'9s SeeTeneille R. Brown, TheAffective Blndness ofEidence Law, 89 DENy. U.L. REV. 47, 6667 (2011) ("Because emotions are so salient, and yet are sometimes subconscious, it might be more
difficult to suppress emotion-evoking evidence than other types of data."); Diamond et al., supra note
193, at 1604-05 ("[T]he only realistic way to prevent the decisionmaker from using the information for
impermissible purposes would be to bar the evidence entirely.").
196 Diamond et al., supranote 193, at 1604
(footnote omitted).
197 Sklansky, supra note 185, at 413, 421. The story model was developed
by psychologists Reid
Hastie and Nancy Pennington. See REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON,
INSIDE THE JURY 22-23 (1983); see also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The StoryModelforJuror
Decision Malking, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192,
192-203 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
19' See Sklansky, supranote 185, at 420-21.
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R. Sunstein's outrage model of how jurors impose punitive damages.'" Under this

theory, punitive "damages are considered an expression of an angry or indignant
attitude toward a transgressor."' Jurors evaluate their outrage, the harm suffered
by the victim, and their relationship to the victim to form their punitive intent.20
Jurors then translate their punitive intent onto a dollar scale and determine the
amount of punitive damages. 2 Jurors who have already determined that punitive
intent may have trouble recalibrating when they are instructed to not punish for
some of the conduct that formed the basis of their punitive intent, especially if they
do not hear about this limitation until after all of the evidence is presented.
Last, results of juror studies and mock juror studies purport to show that jurors
do not follow limiting instructions. Professor David Sklansky recently summarized
the results of thirty-three published studies on the effects of limiting instructions
on mock jurors. 203 Many of those studies indicated that jurors either disregarded
the limiting instruction,' or that the limiting instruction actually backfired,
causing the jury to focus even more on the inadmissible evidence. 205
A Phihp Moris instruction has not been specifically studied, but substantive
punitive damages jury instructions have been studied. 2 06 This research is equally

&

&

&

'" See Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Ernatic
Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINT'Y 49, 51-53 (1998). See
generallyCass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with
Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998) (developing the theory further).
200 Kalueman et al., supra note 199, at 51; see Aso Reid Hastie, What's the Story? Explanations
and Naratives in CivilJary Decisions, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 23, 24-25, 33 (Brian H. Bornstein et al eds., 2008) (describing how mock
jurors constructed a narrative summary of the evidence when asked to consider awarding punitive
damages).
201 Kahneman et al., supra note 199, at 51-52.
202 See id. at 52-53.
0 See Sklansky, supranote 185, at 424-29 &nn.58-90.
2 See id. at 424-29 nn.58-90 (summarizing the results of all the studies); see, e.g., A.N. Doob
H.M. Kirshenbaum, Some EmpiricalEvidence on the Effect ofs. 12 ofthe Canada Evidence Act upon
an Accused, 15 CRim. L.Q 88, 95 (1972); Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior
Record Evidence on JurorDecision Making, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 76 (1995); Valerie P. Hans
& Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberationsof Simulated
Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q 235, 240, 251 (1976); Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, CoercedConfessions and
theJury:An ExperimentalTest ofthe "IarmlessError"Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 44 (1997);
Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A PreliminaryInquiryinto the Effect ofPotentiallyBiasing
Information onJudges andJurorsin CivilLitigation,12 BEHAv. SCl. & L. 113, 122-25 (1994); Stanley
Sue et al., Effects ofInadmissible Evidence on the DecisionsofSimulatedjurors:A Moral Dilemma, 3
J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 345, 351 (1973); Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of
ImpeachmentEvidence andLimiting Instrnctionson Individualand Group DecisionMaking, 12 L.
HUM. BEHAV. 477, 484-89, 494-96 (1988); Carol M. Werner et al., Conviction Proneness and the
Authoritarianjuror Inabilty to DisregardInformation or AttitudinalBias?, 67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
629,629 (1982).
205 Dale W. Broeder, The University ofChicagoJury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 754 (1959);
Russell D. Clark, III, The Role ofCensorshipinMinorityInfluence, 24 EUR.J. SOCIAL PSYCHOL.
331,335-36 (1994); see also Sklansky, supranote 185, at 425 & n.58, 427 &n.78.
' See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages- Empirical Insights and
Implicationsfor Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 144-46 (2002).

=07-208

An Undetectable Constitutional Violation

209

applicable to a Phip Monis instruction, which is actually both a limiting
instruction and a substantive instruction defining what punitive damages can
punish. Professor Jennifer Robbennolt summarized the results of those studies and
their implications: "[t]he empirical research demonstrates that jurors often have
difficulty understanding and applying the judge's instructions on the law."2 07 Some
studies showed that, after determining amounts of punitive damages, jurors could
rarely recall the factors they were supposed to consider in determining those
amounts. 208 Studies also showed that jurors' use of the instructions depended on the
jurors' inclinations about awarding or denying damages. "Juries choosing to impose
punitive damages spent less time discussing the judge's admonition to follow the
instructions and were less likely to discuss each element of the instructions . . . .209
Thus, if a juror wants to impose punitive damages, she is less likely to feel
constrained by any limitations mentioned in the jury instructions-like a Phip
Moris instruction.
Professor Sklansky recently set out to defend limiting instructions, including
defenses against the three main reasons to doubt that limiting instructions work. 21 0
But even Professor Sklansky did not argue that jurors actually follow limiting
instructions. Rather, he argued that jury instructions do "work" by achieving
purposes other than strict juror compliance. 21 ' For example, one purpose of limiting
instructions is to achieve accurate factfinding. Although "[d]ebiasing of any kind is
unlikely to work perfectly," a limiting instruction makes it "less likely that jurors
will overrely [sic] on particular kinds of evidence or react emotionally to it."2 12 He
also explained that some evidentiary rules are intended "to influence the behavior of

Id. at 144 & n.177.
See id. at 144.
209 See id. at 145-46.
210 See Sklansky, supra note 185. Professor Sklansky addresses the arguments based on the story
model, id. at 419-23, and the possible design flaws and the reporting/publication biases of the mock
juror studies, id. at 431-39. One of Sklansky's problems with mock juror studies is that they are studies
ofjurors as opposed to juries, who deliberate with each other. Id. at 433 ("[When jurors have to reason
aloud and to each other, they may find it easier to avoid prohibited inferences and harder to do what the
judge has asked them not to do."). In an extensive study of deliberations for punitive damages, however,
researchers found that "deliberating juries tended to reach the liability result favored pre-deliberation by
the majority of its members." Robbennolt, supra note 206, at 137. This is consistent with psychological
theory concerning "group polarization," which "suggests that following group discussion, group
members' positions tend to become more extreme in the direction initially favored by the majority." Id
at 137. Similarly, "once group members hear about the initial positions of their peers, they are likely to
adjust their preferences in the direction of those initial norms." Id. at 139. In fact, researchers found that
"jurors whose pre-deliberation verdicts were lower were significantly less likely to introduce their predeliberation award as an option for discussion." Id
211 See Sklansky, supra note 185, passim.
212 Id
207
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parties before or after the trial." 213 "[I]nstructions implementing those rules can
function effectively even ifjuries do not follow them with perfect fidelity."214
This defense does not calm concerns about a Philp Morris instruction,
however, as the purpose of a reprehensibility-punishment limiting instruction is to
prevent a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. Juror compliance is
needed to achieve this purpose.215 If juror compliance is in serious doubt, courts
should be hesitant to rely on jury instructions to provide the "constitutionally
important" assurance that juries evaluate nonparty harm only for purposes of
reprehensibility.2 16
3. Explaining the Reprehensibility-Punishment Distinction to the Jury

213 Id. at 417-18. For example, evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is inadmissible to show
tortious conduct. Id at 418. The purpose of the rule to ensure that defendants are not disincentivized
from remedial measures. See id.

214

d

25 See Gash, supranote 60, at 590-91 (explaining that a jury instruction solution to Phip Moris

"rests on the illusion that juries will be able to follow its proposed limiting instructions").
21' See Allen, supra note 48, at 376 (quoting PhipMorris, 549 U.S. at 355); id. at 378 ("[N]one of
the traditional devices mentioned above would actually give a court any real 'assurance' that the jury has
asked the right question. If that is truly a constitutional requirement, pretending that an instruction or
other traditional device will be sufficient is simply wishful thinking." (footnote omitted) (quoting Phibp
Morris, 549 U.S. at 355)).
The Court has expressly recognized that "there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will
not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant,
that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). The first context was a jury instruction prohibiting a jury from considering an
involuntary confession in determining guilt. SeeJackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388-90 (1964). The
second context was an instruction prohibiting a jury from considering a co-defendant's confession as
evidence of another co-defendant's guilt. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 123-25, 136.
Whether possible punishment for causing nonparty harm is one of those contexts is unknown. The
Supreme Court has certainly questioned the general efficacy of punitive damages jury instructions. In
her Hashp dissent, Justice O'Connor explained that standard punitive damage jury instructions "are so
fraught with uncertainty that they defy rational implementation. Instead they encourage inconsistent
and unpredictable results by inviting juries to rely on private beliefs and personal predilections." Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). More recently, a
majority of the Court echoed these concerns, concluding that jury instructions would likely be unable to
solve the unpredictability of punitive damage awards. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,
504 (2008) ("These examples leave us skeptical that verbal formulations, superimposed on general jury
instructions, are the best insurance against unpredictable outliers."). At the same time, a year before
Bruton, the Court found that a limiting instruction was constitutionally sufficient to protect the
defendant when evidence of his prior convictions was admitted in the same proceeding to determine
guilt on the charged crime. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 565-66 (1967). The Court distinguished
Spencerfrom Denno because Denno involved the "protection of a specific constitutional right, and the.
. . procedure was designed as a specific remedy to ensure that an involuntary confession was not in fact
relied upon by the jury." Id. at 564-65. In Spencer, however, "no specific federal right-such as that
dealing with confessions-[was] involved; reliance [was] placed solely on a general 'fairness' approach."
Id. at 565. The Court did, however, clarify a specific constitutional right in Phibp Morris--adefendant
has a specific right to not be punished for harming nonparties. See Phip Monis, 549 U.S. at 553-55.

An Undetectable Constitutional Violation

20r7-2018

211

Professor Sklansky correctly pointed out that the belief that limiting
instructions are obviously ineffective has "made it unnecessary and pointless to ask
what kinds of instructions jurors are apt to follow and what kinds they are apt to
violate." 217 There are, of course, reasons to believe that some jury instructions work
better than others. There is also reason to believe that lower courts should be the
ones to experiment. Professor Brandon Garrett recently explained that the
Supreme Court may not be the best entity to set evidentiary rules: "[E]vidence law
requires knowledge of practice, and trial practice at that, together with practical
challenges in obtaining evidence and presenting facts during litigation. Lower
courts may often be better situated to assess conflict between evidence and
21 8
constitutional rules and to define the scope of remedies pretrial and at trial." Yet,
most of the model instructions have simply echoed the Court's language in Phibp
Morns* consider evidence of nonparty harm for reprehensibility, but do not punish
based on

it.

219

Experimentation can be based on things we know can improve jury
instructions. For instance, Professor Sklansky explained that, "contrary to
expectations, . . . instructions at the end of the trial are more effective than
instructions right after the jury is exposed to the evidence."2 20 Thus, maybe a Phiip
Moris instruction at the end does something right. Although, to ensure that the
jury does not create a narrative based on the nonparty harm, a defense attorney
should also request a Philip Morris instruction when the evidence of nonparty
harm is first introduced.
Sklansky also suggests, although evidence exists to the contrary, "evidentiary
instructions are more apt to be followed if the judge explains the reason for the
underlying rule."22 1 Professor Robbennolt similarly suggested, with respect to
substantive punitive damage instructions, that "provid[ing] explanations and
reasons for the legal rules in addition to the rules themselves" could help jurorsdetermine punitive damage awards. 222
Explaining two points would likely aid jurors in complying with Phibo Moris.
The first is an explanation of how nonparty harm may show the defendant's
conduct toward the plaintiff was reprehensible. Current model instructions do not
bother to do so. 22 3 Instead, they broadly state that nonparty harm can be considered

217

Sklansky, supra note 185, at 451.

218 Garrett, supranote 161, at 118 (footnotes omitted).

See supra Section II.B.ii.1.
Sklansky, supra note 185, at 452 (footnote omitted).
221 Id. But see Pickel, supra note 64, at 423 (summarizing the negative effects of offering a legal
explanation to mock jurors).
222 Robbennolt, supranote 206, at 192.
' For example, shortly after Phibp Morris, Professor Zipursky criticized the Eighth Circuit's
instruction in Supreme Court Review because the court made "no effort ... to specify the reasons" that
the defendant's past and subsequent conduct was "relevant to reprehensibility." Zipursky, supra note
144, at 148.
219
220

212
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as evidence of reprehensibility,22 4 without also explaining to the jury how it can
demonstrate reprehensibility.
The provided explanations should be consistent with the clarified
understanding of how nonparty harm is relevant to reprehensibility. One example:
"In determining the reprehensibility of the defendant's injuring the plaintiff, you
may consider evidence of the defendant similarly injuring nonparties as such
evidence could show the defendant knew that its conduct could injure the
plaintiff," or, "in determining the reprehensibility of the defendant's injuring the
plaintiff, you may consider evidence of the defendant similarly injuring nonparties
as such evidence could show the defendant's conduct was planned or deliberate."
These types of explanations do more than just tell the jury that nonparty harm is
relevant to reprehensibility, as most model instructions do. Instead, the
explanations would help the jury to understand how nonparty harm is relevant to
the level of reprehensibility. This understanding would also inherently dissuade the
jury from punishing based on nonparty harm.
The second explanation that jurors would likely benefit from is why punishing
nonparty harm is improper. Current model instructions lack this explanation,
instead just telling the jury not to punish.2 25 But a simple additional explanation
would help the jury understand why punishment would be improper. For example,
"You may not, however, punish the defendant directly for injuring those
nonparties. Any such punishment would be appropriate only in tort claims brought
by such nonparties."
The explanations also would likely avoid the potential problems with
explanatory instructions discovered in one study. 226 In that study, some mock jurors
heard evidence of prior convictions that was ruled inadmissible and received no
explanation for the inadmissibility disregarded the evidence.2 27 Other jurors
received an explanation from the judge that they were to disregard the evidence
because it might have "improperly suggest[ed] .

.

. that the defendant ha[d] a bad

character and tend[ed] to behave in the same negative way in all situations."
Jurors receiving the explanation "weighted the critical evidence somewhat less, but
they dearly did not ignore the evidence." 22 9 The researcher suggested that the result

224 E.g., ARK. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162, at § 2218A; N.Y. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra
note 162, at § 2:278; N.D. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162, at § C 72.07; OR. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 110, at § 75.02B.
2 See supra note 224.
'2 See Pickel, supra note 64, at 423. Professor Pickel conducted two experiments with inadmissible
evidence. Id. at 422-23. She concluded that jurors disregarded inadmissible hearsay regardless of the
legal explanation. Id. at 423. The result for evidence of prior convictions is discussed in the text.
Ultimately, after conducting experiments, Professor Pickel concluded that "(1) a legal explanation did
not help mock jurors disregard inadmissible evidence; [and] (2) in some circumstances[,] a legal
explanation might backfire, possibly due to increased salience of the critical evidence interacting with
of the fairness of using the evidence to determine guilt." Id.
jurors'
2 27preconceptions
Id. at 415.
228 Id. at 412.
2 Id. at 415.
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was potentially due to defiance or to "jurors' preconceptions of the fairness of using
the evidence to determine guilt."230
This study involved a limiting instruction that the jury should disregard
evidence as opposed to limiting the jury's consideration of the evidence. 2 3 1 jurors
may very well react differently, less defiantly, to limited consideration than forced
disregarding. Additionally, preconceptions of fairness may have less effect in a
Phiblp Moris instruction because it is unlike a normal evidentiary explanation.
23 2
The
Jurors will likely think it is fair to punish for causing nonparty harm.
suggested explanation does not tell jurors that punishment would be unfair and
cannot happen. Instead, it tells jurors that the punishment is possibly appropriate,
but that another jury hearing the case brought by the nonparty must impose it.
Additional judicial explanations may assist jury deliberations.233 One juror may
bring up something about wanting to punish the defendant for also harming
nonparties. A basic Phip Monris instruction should prompt another juror to
explain that such punishment is improper. 234 But that juror has a stronger point
when she could point out that the punishment is improper because such
punishment would need to be decided by another jury, in the tort claim brought by
the nonparty. These suggested explanations, while they would add only a couple
more sentences, could provide clarity about how to comply with PhilipMonris.
iii. Better Appellate Review
Professor Thomas Colby believed that Phip Moids would enable reviewing
courts to "be more aggressive in striking down awards."2 3 s But, Professor Colby
may have underestimated "the difficulty of probing juror reasoning" when
reviewing punitive damage awards. 236 The jury decides whether to award punitive
damages and how much to award.237 And the jury is not required to explain its
decision. Thus, all that is known on review is the amount of the award. The
amount can sometimes indicate that the jury did not follow its instructions. 238 But a
large award or a "high ratio of the punitive damages to the compensatory damages
does not imply that the jury included harms done to others in the calculation of its
23

0 Id. at 423.
231 Id. at 407, 412.
232 See id. at 422 ("If [a jury] decide[s] . . . it is not necessarily unfair to consider [certain] ...

evidence, then [it] ... will [probably] be unwilling to ignore it.").
" See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of deliberation on a jury's
decision).
234 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,355-57 (2007).
235 Colby, supra note 31, at 467.
26 Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 425 (1994).
1 Robbennolt, supra note 207, at 110, 114-15.
" Sassaman v. Heart City Toyota, 879 F. Supp. 901, 912 (N.D. Ind. 1994) ("The court may
determine that the jury failed to follow the instruction only if the jury's damage award is so high that it
could have only been the product of passion or sympathy." (citing Haluschak v. Dodge City of
Wauwatosa, 909 F.2d 254,256 (7th Cir. 1990))).
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award." To the contrary, a large award could indicate that the jury found the
defendant's conduct especially reprehensible and thus deserving of a large award.
Ironically, the result-a large award-can be the same when the jury asks either the
right or the wrong question.
Even in Phi Monis itself, "[t]he Court technically did not reach the question
of whether, in fact, the jury . .. punished Philip Morris for conduct directed at
others" in awarding the plaintiff nearly $80 million.2 4 Such punishment was
suspected because of the lack of a jury instruction precluding that use of the
evidence, plaintiffs attorney's reference to other Oregonian smokers, and the size
of the award.24 ' But none of these factors demonstrates that the jury violated Phip
Monis; and the Court never actually found that the jury in Phip Monis punished
for nonparty harm. 242 Plainly, we do not know the jury's basis for the $80 million.
Because of the reliance on jury instructions, Professor Colby's prediction of
aggressive judicial review243 has so far proven incorrect. If anything, appellate
review has become less aggressive. Reviewing courts have looked at whether the
Monris instruction. If so, the award does not include
trial court gave a H
punishment for nonparty harm and no violation occurred. This deferential review is
inconsistent with the importance ofjudicial review of punitive damage awards.
Even though Professor Colby has not been correct so far, he still could be. Even
when trial courts use PiihpMonris instructions, more aggressive judicial review is
possible and necessary.
1. How Reliance on Jury Instructions Affects Judicial Review
In February 2016, a jury in the famously plaintiff-friendly St. Louis City Court
found Johnson & Johnson liable for fraud and negligence related to its insufficient
warning about the possible link between ovarian cancer and the use of talc powder
for feminine hygiene. 2 4 This case is one of thousands that have been filed related
to this alleged warning defect. 24 5 The St. Louis City jury awarded the plaintiff $10
million in compensatory damages and $62 million in punitive damages. 2 4

-

" Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 232, 239 (D. Mass. 2007), rev'don other
520 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008).
grounds,
2
4 Allen, supranote 48, at 355, 357.
241 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 350 (2007).
242 The same was true in BMV ofNorth Ameica, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 573-75 (1996). The
Court first introduced the reprehensibility-punishment distinction with respect to out-of-state conduct.
Id. We do not actually know if the jury in BMWawarded $4 million to punish the defendant for its
out-of-state conduct. The Supreme Court assumed so because lower Alabama courts assumed so, id. at
573, but we cannot know.
243 Colby, supranote 31, at 467.
" Kim Bell, St. Louis Jury OrdersJohnson & Johnson to Pay $72 Millon in Talcum Powder
Cancer Case, ST. LOUIs POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime879
9
and-courts/st-louis-jury-orders-johnson-johnson-to-pay-million-in/article26e6046c-f 7d-5a6d-a
a97535dd78bc.html [https://perma.cc/865L-H2V8].
2 45
Id.
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'

The appellate court overruled the case based on a lack of personal
jurisdiction,2 4 7 but valid questions also existed concerning the constitutionality of
the punitive damage award. The jury heard evidence that thousands of others had
been injured by Johnson & Johnson's conduct. 24 8 Did the jury find the defendant's
conduct especially reprehensible, consistent with Phibp Monris? Is that why it
awarded $62 million? Or, does that $62 million violate PhibpMorris because the
jury also punished Johnson & Johnson for injuring others?
But the jury received a Philp Morisjury instruction.249 It received the Missouri
pattern instruction, which tells the jury- "You may consider harm to others in
determining whether defendant['s] . . . conduct showed complete indifference to or
conscious disregard for the safety of others. However, in determining the amount
of any punitive damages award, you must not include damages for harm to others
who are not parties to this case."25 0 Thus, the jury was told not to include damages
for harm to nonparties, yet the jury still awarded $62 million in punitive damages
in a claim brought by one plaintiff.25
The size of the award does not really indicate a violation. Plus, the jury was
instructed to not violate Phibp Morris,2 2 and the jury is presumed to have followed
that instruction.2 5 3 Even if it wants to, there is little room for an appellate court to
reverse a punitive damage award based on Philp Mornis.2 54 Because juries are

247 Estate of Fox v. Johnson &Johnson, No. ED 104580, 2017 WL 4629383, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App.
Oct. 17, 2017), reh'g and/or transfer denied (Dec. 19, 2017).
248 Bell, supra note 244 (quoting the plaintiffs attorney that he was "able
to prove that
approximately 1,500 die each year because of the talc involvement").
249 Jury 1nstructions, at Instruction No. 27, Estate of Jacqueline Fox v. Johnson & Johnson, No.
1422CCO901201,
2016 WL 795960 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2016).
25

0 id.
251 One juror explained that the "$62 million total was calculated at $1 million for each year of Fox's

life." Bell, supra note 244. If this is true and was true for the jury as a group, then the $62 million may
not include punishment for harming nonparties. Compliance with Phihp Moris, however, does not
mean this is a rational way to calculate punitive damages.
252 Remarkably, some courts doubt a possible Phihp Monis violation even if the jury is not properly
instructed. See Campbell v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2:12-cv-08633, 2016 WL 5796906, at *12 (S.D.W.
Va. Oct. 3, 2016) (rejecting Phip Morrischallenge because no evidence showed "that the jury did not
follow the court's instruction to consider each claim separately [and] plaintiffs' counsel did not ask the
jury to punish BSC for harm caused to other plaintiffs"); Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660
F.3d 487, 506 (1st Cir. 2011); Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 591 F.3d 761, 780 (5th Cir. 2009)
(dismissing possibility of a Phi~p Morrisviolation because "[the jury instructions and questions clearly
indicated that the jury was to assess punitive damages specifically as to each Appellee"); Oleszkowicz v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 129 So. 3d 1272, 1288 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (dismissing possibility of PhihpMonis
violation because jury was instructed "punitive damages could only be awarded if Plaintiff proved Exxon
Mobil's wanton and reckless conduct threatened or endangered Plaintiff, and that Exxon Mobil knew or
should have known probable harm to Plaintiff would result from its conduct").
253 Jones v. Unites States, 527 U.S. 373, 394 (1999).
254 Scott P. Stolley, The Elusive Nuance in Philip Morris USA v. Williamson [sic], APP. ADVOC.,
Summer 2007, at 23, 24 ("If a Phip Moris-type instruction is given and a big punitive-damages
verdict still results, then it will be difficult for courts to determine whether the jury actually followed the
instruction."). The title is slightly misleading in that the title of the case is incorrect, but the article
discusses the Phip Monris USA v. Wilams, 546 U.S. 346 (2007).
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presumed to follow their instructions, judicial review is essentially limited to asking
only if the jury was properly instructed. If so, the defendant's constitutional rights
were not violated.
This rubber-stamp review is already apparent in the few courts that have
evaluated a punitive damage award for compliance with Phihp Monis.55 In
Shannon v. Sassevill the trial court denied post-trial relief based on a possible
Phibp Morrisviolation.2 6 The trial court explained:
Here, I charged the jury explicitly that jurors could consider Sasseville's

molestation of his daughters to measure the reprehensibility of his
conduct toward Shannon, but that they could not punish Sasseville for
harm he caused anyone other than Shannon. Sasseville points to no
direct evidence suggesting that the jury did not follow my instruction. I
conclude that the jury instruction satisfied the Php Monris standard.
Sasseville's speculation that the size of the jury's award shows that the
jury must not have been able to "make the Orwellian ...
evidentiary
distinction" between considering harm to others for the purpose of
determining that his acts were reprehensible and not considering it when
"arriving at the level of punitive damages," is only that-speculadon.
Under Phip Moris, the jury was entitled to consider the prior
misconduct in assessing the reprehensibility of Sasseville's conduct
toward Shannon, and I turn to that reprehensibility.n 7
In Wion v City ofHazelwood, defendant complained after trial of a possible
Phip Morris violation based on the admission of evidence of prior citizen
complaints. 2 58 The court denied a violation noting that it used the Eighth Circuit's
model Philp Morris compliant punitive damage instruction. 2 59 The court also
noted that its bifurcation of the trial helped preclude a Philp Morisviolation, even
though the jury would have still heard evidence of nonparty harm when
determining the amount of punitive damages in the second phase of the trial?
Last, the court found no Hzilip Morrisviolation because "the admission of evidence
during the second phase of the trial of complaints against Defendant and of his

2 Many courts have avoided judicial review thus far because of waiver. See, e g., Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Miell, 569 F. Supp. 2d 841, 849-53 (N.D. Iowa 2008); Kauffman v. Maxim Healthcare
Sers., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 210, 215-16 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 73 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 277, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Qwest Servs. Corp v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071, 1086, 1088 (Colo.
2011); Rinehart v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 261 S.W.3d 583, 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Quintinsky v.
Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 03-07-00299-CV, 2008 WL 1911319, at *12 (Tex. App. Apr. 30, 2008);
Bennett v. Reynolds, 242 S.W.3d 866, 902 (Tex. App. 2007).
256 Shannon v. Sasseville, 684 F. Supp. 2d 169, 175-77 (D. Me. 2010).
1
Id. at 175-76 (footnote and citations omitted).
258 Wilson v. City of Hazelwood, 628 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069-70 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
2 Id. at 1070.
' Id. ("[B]ifurcation of the trial precluded the jury's hearing evidence which could have been
prejudicial in the first phase and facilitated its hearing evidence in the second phase which was relevant
to the jury's consideration of the amount of punitive damages.").
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being referred to counseling was relevant to the jury's determination of the amount
of punitive damages."26
Similarly, in Cleavenger v. Univ. of Oregon, the defendant complained after
trial that the jury punished it for causing nonparty harm.2 6 2 The trial court refused
post-trial relief.263 The trial court specifically told the jury that it could not "set the
amount of any punitive damages in order to punish the defendant for harm to
anyone other than the plaintiff in this case."2 64 Tle jury was presumed to have
followed this instruction, citing Supreme Court precedent saying the same.2 65 The
trial court was not concerned that the plaintiffs counsel's dosing argument
"touched on 'harm to people who [were] not parties to this case,'" because that
reference was "insufficient to overcome the presumption that the jury followed its
instructions, particularly given the evidence in the record that could support a
finding there was reprehensible conduct toward Plaintiff." Last, the trial court
explained that a Philip Mornis violation in this case was less likely than in Phip
Morris itself because "unlike in Phip Monis the Court [here] explicitly told the
jury it could not punish Defendants for having caused injury to others.2 6 1 "By
giving that jury instruction, the Court actively protected against the risk that the
jury would improperly impose punitive damages."2 6 1
Another example of rubber-stamp review occurred in McEgunn v. Cuna
MutualInsuranceSociety.2 69 Defendant complained about admission of evidence of
other state nonparty harm, but the court was not concerned. 27 0 "With regard to
punitive damages, the court specifically instructed the jury that it could "not include
in [its] award of damages any sum that represent[ed] damages for injuries to any
person other than Powell."2 7 1 The court also pointed out that the Supreme Court
had recently emphasized that "juries are presumed to follow the court's

261

d

Cleavenger v. Univ. of Oregon, No. CV 13-1908-DOC, 2016 WL 814810, at *12 (D. Or. Feb.
29, 2016).
2 63
262

4

26

Id
id,

265 Id. (citing Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000).
266

d

267

d

Id.; see abo Hull ex rel. Senne v. Ability Ins. Co., No. CV-10-116-BLG-RFC, 2012 WL
6083614, at *6 (D. Mont. Dec. 6, 2012) (explaining jury instructions on imposing punitive damages);
Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 232, 236, 238-39 (D. Mass. 2007), rev'd on other
grounds, 520 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008) (denying a Phibp Mois violation because trial provided a "strong"
limiting instruction that evidence was admitted only for the "limited purpose of notice"); Philip Morris
USA Inc. v. Cohen, 102 So. 3d 11, 17-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining jury instructions on
imposing punitive damages); Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 233 P.3d 1221, 1255-56
(Idaho 2010) (explaining jury instructions on imposing punitive damages); Perrine v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 694 S.E.2d 815, 876-77 (W. Va. 2010) (explaining jury instructions on imposing
punitive damages).
269 See McElgunn v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1158 (D.S.D. 2010).
270 See id at 1152.
268

271

id.
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instructions."272 Because the jury instructions were dear and the jury is presumed to
follow those instructions, the lower court did not error in admitting evidence of the
defendant's causing nonparty harm. 27 3 The court did, however, reduce the punitive
damage award from a 30:1 ratio to compensatory damages to an 8:1 ratio. 27 4
Rightly or wrongly, the presence of the jury instruction makes it difficult to find
a Philp Monis violation. In Mentick v. PaulRevere Life Insurance Co., the Ninth
Circuit reversed a $10 million punitive damage award because the evidence
presented at trial-of a "decade-long scheme . . . to terminate expensive insurance
policies"-created a significant risk" that the jury punished the defendant for
harming nonparties with the $10 million total punitive damages. 2 75 The trial court
erred in denying the requested Phlp Moris instruction, and the Ninth Circuit
remanded for a new trial for punitive damages. 276 T next jury received the Phib
Moris instruction. 2 7 7 The second jury awarded $60 million in punitive damages,
six times more than the previous jury that was not given the Phh
Moris
instruction.2 78 Even though the award is higher, it is difficult to conclude that the
second jury violated Php Morris, however, because the second jury was properly
instructed. 2 79 That is the effect that a Phlp Monisjury instruction has on review.
Id. (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Hensley, 556 U.S. 838, 841 (2009)).
Id.
274 Id. at 1168-69.
275 Merrickv. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 1007,1009,
1016 (9th Cir. 2007).
276 Id. at 1015-18.
277 The instruction was:
272
273

In assessing punitive damages you may punish a defendant only for that conduct which it
directed towards the plaintiff. You may not directly punish a defendant for harm to anyone
other than Mr. Merrick. I allowed you to hear evidence about conduct that may have harmed
others, only to allow you to consider more fully the question of the reprehensibility of the
conduct directed towards Mr. Merrick.
In other words, you may use all the evidence you have heard or seen to determine how
reprehensible or bhneworthy a defendant's conduct was. This includes evidence of how a
defendant's actions may have harmed others besides Mr. Merrick. In deciding what amount,
if any, should be awarded as punitive damages, you may not award an amount to punish for
harm that may have been caused to people other than Mr. Merrick.

Jury

Instructions at Instruction No. 15, Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D.
Nev. June 25,2008) (No. 2:00-CV-0731-JCM-RJJ).
278 Jury Verdict, Menick, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D. Nev. June 26, 2008) (No. CV-S-00-0731JCM-RJJ) (awarding $36 million in punitive damages against UnumProvident Corporation); Jury
Verdict, Menick 594 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D. Nev. June 26, 2008) (No. CV-S-00-0731-JCM-RJ)
(awarding $24 million in punitive damages against Paul Revere Life Insurance Company). Thus, the
total punitive damages award against the defendants was $60 million.
279 In two other reversals due to the denial of a Ph@p Monis instruction, the second jury awarded a
smaller amount of punitive damages. In Bullock v. Phb Monis USA, Inc., the appellate court reversed
a $28 million punitive damage award. 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 775, 802, 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). On remand,
the new jury in the limited retrial (on punitive damages only) awarded $13.8 million in punitive
damages. Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). In
Estate of Schwarz ex rel Schwarz v. Phibp Monis Inc., the jury awarded $150 million total punitive
damages, which the trial court reduced to $100 million. 235 P.3d 668, 672 (Or. 2010). The case was
adhered to on reconsideration. Estate of Schwarz ex rel. Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc., 246 P.3d 479,
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Rubber-stamp review based on the presence of a jury instruction is also what
courts have used to evaluate challenges based on the BAW/State Farm prohibition
on punishment for out-of-state conduct. 2 80 If properly instructed, the jury must
have considered the evidence for reprehensibility purposes, but not as a basis for
punishment.281 Interestingly, many states have incorporated the guideposts into
jury instructions, something the Court has never required but some scholars believe
to be appropriate. 282 Reviewing courts have not, however, simply questioned
whether the jury was properly instructed. 28 3 Instead, courts will still independently
apply the guideposts even though the jury, presumably, followed the guidepost
instructions. 284

Regardless, it is difficult to square this deferential review with the Supreme
Court's explanations of why meaningful judicial review of punitive damage awards
is constitutionally required. In Honda, the Court specifically explained that judicial
review is constitutionally required to protect against "the possibility that a jury will
not follow those instructions. "285 Thus, punitive damages are one area in which the
480 (Or. 2010). On remand, the jury awarded $25 million. Estate of Schwarz ex reL Schwarz v. Philip

Morris USA Inc., No. 0002-01376, 2012 WL 3055174, at *1 (Or. Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 2012). The author
could not locate the amount of punitive damages awarded in the remand for numerous other cases in
which the appellate court reversed the original award. See Guyoungtech USA, Inc. v. Dees, 156 So. 3d
374, 385-86 (Ala. 2014); Frankson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 886 N.Y.S.2d 714, 722
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E.2d 5, 23-25 (S.C. 2010); Westgate
Resorts, Ltd. v. Consumer Prot. Grp., 285 P.3d 1219, 1221-26 (Utah 2012). The author located only
one case where the court relied on Phihp Morris in reducing the punitive damage award. Quigley v.
Winter, 584 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1160-62 (N.D. Iowa 2008). In Quigley v. Winter, the district court
cited Philp Morris and the ratio guidepost in reducing a $250,000 punitive damage award to
$20,527.50. Id at 1162. The Eighth Circuit later increased the award to $54,750, but did not cite Phip
Monis. Qigleyv. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 955-56 (8th Cir. 2010).
280 See, e.g., Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594, 603-04 (8th Cir. 2005).
2s1 See id.; Guidance Endodontics, LLC v. Dentsply Intl, Inc., No. CIV 08-1101 JB/RLP, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37267, at *41 (D.N.M. 2011); Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 233
P.3d 1221, 1225 (Idaho 2010).
282 See, e.g., Anthony J. Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, InstructingJurieson Punitive Damages:
Due ProcessRevisitedAfier State Farm, 6 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 423,521-22 (2004).
283 See, e.g., Perrine v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 694 S.E,2d 815, 886, 894-96 (W. Va.
2010) (reviewing the punitive damage award for the federal due process guideposts despite the fact the
jury was instructed on the reprehensibility and ratio guideposts).
28

4 See id.

Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 433-35 (1994). Maybe judicial review of
whether the jury actually punished the defendant for causing nonparty harm is not necessary because
Philip Monis only guarantees a procedural and not a substantive right. See Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007); see also supra note 31. As one commentator hypothesized285

If a PApMonis-type instruction is given, it is at least possible that the jury will understand
the nuance, follow the instruction, and get it right. Maybe the court and the parties won't be
able to tell if the jury followed the instruction, but at least the defendant will have been given
a fighting chance. And in a rough sort of way, isn't that what procedural due process is
about-that each party be given a fighting chance?
Stolley, supra note 254, at 24. Much has been written questioning the purported procedural due process

basis for Philp Monis, including by Justice Thomas in his dissent. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 361
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Supreme Court specifically identified the potential risk of juries not following
instructions. But, current review based on Ph@i~ Monis is practically limited to
questioning whether the jury was properly instructed-without any ability to
determine that the jury disregarded that instruction.m
2. Better Judicial Review
Much can be done to improve judicial review of a possible Phip Monis
violation. The more sophisticated understanding of the reprehensibilitypunishment distinction alone will better aid courts. They must have greater
awareness that evidence of nonparty harm does not necessarily demonstrate
reprehensibility.
This awareness combined with an evidentiary rule akin to Rule 609(a) already
will provide for more aggressive review (and reversals) given that evidence should
be included only if its prejudicial effect is less than its probative value. Moreover,
this judicial review should be de novo. It is well established that de novo review
applies to determinations on the constitutionality of punitive damage awards."'
Possible Ph~ Monis violations based on the admission of evidence of nonparty
harm should also be reviewed de novo. This review will allow the
reprehensibility-punishment distinction to "acquire more meaningful content" and
will better give direction and clarification for lower courts.288 True, evidentiary
determinations are usually reviewed for abuse of discretion, but not always.'
Because of the constitutional implications, courts have used de novo review to
determine whether the lower court's admission of evidence violated the defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights.' The admission of evidence of nonparty harm also
has constitutional implications, and should be reviewed de novo.
The Court should similarly use a de novo standard of review to evaluate
whether jury instructions sufficiently protected the defendant's constitutional
rights. To assure that the jury asked the right question, as Phlp Monis mandates,
reviewing courts must ask more than just "was the jury properly instructed" and
then presume compliance with that instruction.2 First, the court should review the
context of the instructions. Were the instructions dear? Did the instruction explain
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("It matters not that the Court styles today's holding as 'procedural' because the
'procedural' rule is simply a confusing implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court
has created for punitive damages." (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment))); see also supra note 31 (citing those who have questioned the
procedural due process basis of Phip Monris). If this is correct, it would mean that a defendant has a
right to a procedural protection, but no further right to complain if the jury still punished it for causing
nonparty harm. See supranote 31.
'

See discussion supra Section II.B.iii.1.

Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001).
288 Id.
259 United States v. Malpica-Garcia, 489 F.3d 393, 395 (1st Cir. 2007).
290 Id.
" See id. at 355-5 7.
287
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to the jury how nonparty harm could show reprehensibility? Did the instruction
further explain why the jury could not punish the defendant for causing nonparty
harm?
Importantly, the reviewing court must also evaluate any references to nonparty
harm made during trial. For example, were the plaintiffs attorney's references to
nonparty harm limited to reprehensibility-to show the defendant's knowledge,
plan, lack of mistake, etc.? As an example, did the plaintiff point to instances of
nonparty harm to show that the defendant knew of the probability of injuring the
plaintiff, or did the plaintiffs attorney encourage direct punishment for nonparty
harm? Unless the plaintiffs attorney also explains how nonparty harm shows
reprehensibility, references to nonparty harm risk a Phip Monis violation.
Because of that risk, the reviewing court should closely review any references to
nonparty harm.
Ultimately, we cannot know whether a jury punished a defendant for causing
nonparty harm. But that does not mean that reviewing courts have to just assume
that the jury asked the right question.
CONCLUSION

In 1991, Justice O'Connor lamented that punitive damages jury instructions
were far from adequate: "[r]arely is a jury told anything more specific than 'do what
you think best."'9 2 The use of a PhilpMorisinstruction means juries are now told
more. But Justice O'Connor would likely not view a confusing and general,
"consider evidence of nonparty harm for reprehensibility, but do not punish based
on it" instruction as an improvement. 293
The first step to complying with Phihp Moids is better understanding the
reprehensibility-punishment distinction and ensuring that admitted evidence :of
nonparty harm actually demonstrates reprehensibility. If so, courts should then
evaluate the admissibility of evidence of nonparty harm under a more
exclusion-friendly balancing test, integrate explanations into Philip Mornis jury
instructions, and still investigate the possibility of a Phip Monis violation on
appeal despite the use of a jury instruction.
It will always be difficult to detect a Ph@ Monris violation after trial. But
admitted futility does not protect defendants' constitutional rights. Use of these
suggested measures will help comply with the Supreme Court's mandate that juries
ask the right question with respect to nonparty harm.

292
293

Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See PhioMoRis, 549 U.S. at 355.

